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The Proverbial Catch-22: The Unconstitutionality
of Section Five of the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendments of 1986
JEssE I. SANTANA*
INTRODUCTION
In an effort to combat an apparent increase in "sham" mar-
riages,' Congress enacted the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments of 1986.2 The amendments3 dramatically alter the
* Associate, Crosby, Heafey, Roach & May, Oakland, California; LL.M., Ge-
orgetown University Law Center (1988); J.D., University of San Francisco, School of Law
(1987); B.A., California State University, Chico (1984). The author wishes to dedicate this
article to his parents: Hay Tiempos que pienso que no voy a poder vencer obstdculos o
terminar proyectos en 6sta vida. Pero gracias a Dios que tengo personas como mis
creadores Jos6 y Marid que me dan valor, fuerza y dnimo para seguir adelante. Por eso,
con mucho cariflo quiero dedicar 6ste exegesis a estas personas. Gracias mamd y papd.
1. A sham marriage is a marriage entered into, or concealed by a United States
citizen (or permanent resident) and an alien whereby the alien improperly obtains perma-
nent resident status by circumventing the immigration law restrictions. See United States
General Accounting Office Report, Immigration Marriage Fraud: Controls in Most Coun-
tries Surveyed Stronger Than in U.S., 1 (1986) [hereinafter GAO Report]; 1 C. GORDON
& H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.18a(16) (1987). Because of
the special status accorded to the alien spouses of American citizens and permanent resi-
dents, some aliens, either because they do not qualify for immigration to this country, or if
qualified, are not willing to wait until an immigrant visa becomes available, enter into
fraudulent marriages with citizens or permanent residents of the United States in order to
gain swift entry into this country. See infra note 4 and accompanying text; H.R. RP. No.
906, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 6 (1986); D. MARTIN, MAJOR ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION LAv 42-43
(1987). One INS survey suggests that approximately 30% of all petitions for immigrant
visas based on a marriage to an American citizen or permanent resident involves "suspect
marital relationships." See Fraudulent Marriage and Fiance Arrangements To Obtain Per-
manent Resident Immigration Status: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration
and Refugee Policy of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 35
(1985) [hereinafter Fraudulent Marriage Hearing] infra note 4, at 35; see also S. RaP.
No. 491, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 6 (1986).
2. Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
3. For an overview of the new provisions in the Immigration Marriage Fraud
1
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policy and procedures aliens must follow in obtaining permanent
resident status by means of a marriage to a U.S. citizen or lawful
permanent resident." Under prior law, an alien applying for per-
manent resident status on the basis of such a marriage would ob-
tain his or her visa and accompanying resident status in the
United States shortly after the application was filed.' However,
the new legislation imposes a two-year conditional status on per-
manent residence for the alien."
Amendments of 1986, see Gordon, The Immigration Legislation: The Immigration Re-
form and Control Act of 1986, The Marriage Fraud Act, The State Department Efficiency
Bill, I GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 641, 652-55 (1986); Shane, Family Law: Marriage Fraud and
Other Amendments, 61 FLA. B.J. 36 (1987); Boiston, An Overview: The Immigration Re-
form and Control Act of 1986 and The Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of
1986, 60 OHio ST. B.A. REP. 150, 157-60 (1987); Drake, Zacovic, Wheeler & Poplowski,
Sweeping Changes in Immigration Laws Affect Aliens' Rights to Work and Legalize Their
Status, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE RV. 74, 84-85 (1987).
4. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 annually limits the number
of immigrant visas that can be issued worldwide to 270,000, with a limit of 20,000 visas for
any one country. See generally INA § 202, 8 U.S.C. § 1152 (1982); See also GAO Report,
supra note 1, at 1. The INA also categorizes aliens seeking to enter this country and makes
some of those categories subject to these annual worldwide and per country limits. See
generally C. GORDON & E. GORDON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE ch. 2 (Desk ed.
1987); Danilov & Nerheim, Marriage, Divorce, the Alien, and Washington Law, 19 GONZ.
L. REV. 303, 305 (1983). Aliens in oversubscribed categories in some countries may have to
wait as long as fifteen years before receiving an immigrant visa. Countries such as Mexico,
the Philippines and Hong Kong, with large backlogs of visa hopefuls exhaust their annual
quotas as soon as they become available. Their waiting lists continue to grow. See Fraudu-
lent Marriage Hearing, supra note 1, (Statement of Alan C. Nelson, Immigration and
Naturalization Service Commissioner); see also A Report of the United States Commission
on Civil Rights, The Tarnished Golden Door: Civil Rights Issues in Immigration, 17-18
(1980).
The United States immigration policy, however, has historically recognized the impor-
tance of protecting the nuclear family when granting immigration benefits. See H.R. REP.
No. 906, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1986). Thus, for family unification reasons, the INA
exempts the immediate relatives from these numerical restrictions on visas of United States
citizens which includes alien spouses. See INA § 201(a), (b); 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a), (b)
(1982); S. REP. No. 491, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 1, 8 (1986); see generally C. GORDON & E.
GORDON, supra, at ch 2.18. Aliens who marry lawful permanent residents, although not
exempt from these numerical limits, are given second "preference" status. See INA §
203(a)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2) (1982).
5. Prior to the amendments, the average processing time of the application was two
to four months. See Boiston, supra note 3, at 158. See also Comment, Immigration Mar-
riage Fraud Amendments of 1986: Till Congress Do Us Part, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1087
(1987).
6. See INA § 216; 8 U.S.C. § 1186a (Supp. IV 1986), added by the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendments [hereinafter IMFA], § 2. Within the final 90 days of this
two-year period, both the alien spouse and United States citizen or permanent resident
spouse must petition the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to have the condi-
tional status "removed." INA § 216(c)(1), (d)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1186a (c)(1); (d)(1) (Supp.
IV 1986). When the couple is interviewed by the INS pursuant to the foregoing petition,
they must show that: (1) their marriage has not been judicially annulled or terminated
during the conditional period; (2) their marriage was not fraudulently entered into for the
main purpose of circumventing the immigration law restrictions; and (3) the filing of the
petition did not involve the alien paying a fee or other consideration to the U.S. citizen or
2
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Section Five is the most troubling of the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendments. 7 Under this section, an alien who marries a
U.S. citizen or permanent resident while involved in deportation
or exclusion hearings is no longer provided the opportunity to pre-
sent evidence establishing the bona fides of the marriage.8 Also,
the alien is now deprived of the opportunity to apply for an adjust-
ment of status (a discretionary remedy used to prevent the alien's
deportation) . In addition, a visa petition to accord the alien the
status of immediate relative or second preference may no longer
be approved until he has completed a two-year foreign residency
requirement, i.e., he must reside outside the United States for a
two-year period after the marriage.' 0 Accordingly, because this
permanent resident. See INA § 275; 8 U.S.C. § 1325; see also D. MARTIN, supra note 1,
44-45; Drake, Zacovic, Wheeler, & Poplowski, supra note 3, at 84-85.
If the removal petition is granted, the conditional status is removed and the alien spouse
is afforded full-fledged permanent resident status. See D. MARTIN supra note 1, at 44. On
the other hand, if the couple fails to file a timely petition for removal of the conditional
status, or if the petition is denied, the alien spouse's conditional resident status is termi-
nated and he or she becomes deportable. The administrative review of these determinations
occurs in a deportation hearing. Consequently, judicial review of any order of deportation
then becomes available. See generally INA §9 216(c)(2), (c)(3); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1186a(c)(2),
(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
7. Section Five(a) (amending INA 9 245(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(e)), provides the
following:
(1) An alien who is seeking to receive an immigrant visa on the basis of a mar-
riage which was entered into during the period described in paragraph (2) may
not have the alien's status adjusted under subsection (a) of this section [permits an
alien to adjust his or her status within the discretion of the Attorney General].
(2) The period described in this paragraph is the period during which administra-
tive or judicial proceedings are pending regarding the alien's right to enter or re-
main in the United States.
IMFA § 5(a), added by Act of November 10, 1986, P.L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537.
Section Five(b) added the following subparagraph to INA § 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1154:
(h) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section [which allows the filing of a
petition for immediate relative or second preference status on behalf of the alien
spouse], a petition may not be approved to grant an alien immediate relative sta-
tus or preference status by reason of a marriage which was entered into during the
period described in § 245(e)(2), until the alien has resided outside the United
States for a two-year period beginning after the date of the marriage.
IMFA § 5(b), added by Act of November 10, 1986, P.L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537; see
also Matter of Egbunine, Interim Dec. #3034 (BIA 1987).
8. Critics have already begun to question the effectiveness of these new provisions.
See Recent Developments, Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986: The Over-
looked Immigration Bill, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 319, 322, 325 (1987); Drake, Zacovic,
Wheeler & Poplowski, supra note 3, at 85.
9. See supra note 7.
10. Concerned with immigration marriage fraud, Congress requested the General
Accounting Office to conduct a survey of the methods and controls employed by other
countries in detecting and preventing sham marriages. The General Accounting Office cir-
culated a questionnaire on the marriage fraud problem to the following twelve countries:
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy,
Japan, Mexico, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. See GAO Report, supra note 1, at 8-9.
This survey suggested that most of the countries surveyed had stronger controls to combat
marriage fraud than did the United States. For example, some countries reported that they
3
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provision provides no opportunity for the alien to prove the bona
fides of the marriage, it establishes, in form and in fact, an ir-
rebuttable presumption of marriage fraud."'
Recent marriages entered into between U.S. citizens or perma-
nent residents and alien spouses have become a testing ground
during deportation hearings for Section Five, which threatens to
separate the couple.12 Part II of this article argues that as applied
to deportation hearings, Section Five violates the alien's proce-
dural due process rights. Aliens who are involved in deportation
hearings have constitutionally protected "liberty" and "property"
interests at stake. For this reason, the due process clause of the
fifth amendment envisions that aliens involved in deportation pro-
ceedings receive a fair hearing at which they will have a reasona-
ble opportunity to present evidence establishing the bona fides of
the marriage. By depriving aliens who marry during deportation
hearings of both the opportunity to present this evidence and the
opportunity to apply for an adjustment of status before being de-
prived of these constitutionally protected interests, Section Five
contravenes the procedural safeguards normally afforded by the
due process clause. Before the couple can be deprived of their im-
portant interests that are at stake, a pre-deprivation informal
hearing, at a minimum, is necessary. This hearing would inquire
into the couple's motives for entering into the marriage during the
deportation hearing.
Part III of this article scrutinizes Section Five under an equal
protection analysis. It is argued that the imposition of the two-
year foreign residency requirement and the elimination of the de-
fense of adjustment of status for aliens who marry U.S. citizens or
permanent residents while in deportation proceedings impermissi-
bly interferes with the fundamental rights of marriage and famil-
required alien spouses of their citizens to fulfill some form of conditional residency require-
ment before being granted resident status. GAO Report, supra note 1, at 3-12. (Denmark,
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan required aliens who
married their citizens to fulfill some type of conditional residency period ranging anywhere
from three months to ten years.) In addition, several countries reported that before being
granted resident status, the alien and his or her citizen spouse had to prove their marriage
was not entered into fraudulently. Examples of evidence that could be used to make this
showing included proof of cohabitation, joint ownership of property, and joint tax returns
filed by the couple. See, GAO Report, supra note 1, at 4.
11. Frye, Through the Looking Glass Darkly-Section 5 of the Immigration Mar-
riage Fraud Amendments, 11 IMMIGR. J. 1, 8 (1988). For an extensive discussion of Section
Five's creation of an irrebuttable presumption of marriage fraud, see Comment, supra note
5, at 1106-08.
12. See Newlywed Says "I Don't" to Deportation: Maryland Couple Challenges
INS Marriage Fraud Law, The Washington Post, Mar. 26, 1988, at B1, col. 1. See also
Azizi v. Meese, Civil No. H87-957 (1988) (granting the U.S. citizen and alien couple's
preliminary injunction in an action challenging the INS's enforcement of Section Five);
Smith v. INS, Civil No. 87-1988-C (1988).
[Vol. 25
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ial integrity. Under an equal protection analysis, however, the Su-
preme Court traditionally does not apply strict scrutiny to federal
legislation in the immigration area. It is argued, nevertheless, that
the Court should apply intermediate scrutiny in determining the
constitutionality of Section Five. Under this test, even if Congress
put forth an "important" interest in deterring immigration mar-
riage fraud, Section Five is unconstitutional because the proce-
dures established by this provision are not "substantially related"
to achieving this interest. In addition, this provision is analyzed
under the minimum scrutiny test which the Court usually employs
in determining the constitutionality of federal government classifi-
cations based on alienage. It is argued that even under this more
relaxed standard of review, Section Five is constitutionally defi-
cient, at least as applied to deportation hearings. Drawing a dis-
tinction between aliens who marry before, as opposed to after be-
coming involved in deportation hearings, is not "rationally
related" to accomplishing the federal government's purpose in en-
acting Section Five.
Before delving into these points, however, the judicial deference
exhibited by the Supreme Court to federal immigration legislation
needs to be examined. To this, Part I is devoted.
I. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO CONGRESSIONAL AND EXECUTIVE
BRANCH ACTIONS IN IMMIGRATION MATTERS
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that the power
of Congress and the Executive Branch in the immigration area is
broad.13 When reviewing immigration legislation drafted by the
federal government, the Court has thus far deferred to the judg-
ment of the other branches of government. 4 To date, the Court
has never upheld an alien's substantive due process or equal pro-
tection challenge leveled against a federal immigration statute.15
In several instances, however, the Court has stated that in a
proper case, a provision in a federal immigration statute might be
13. See generally Galvan v. Press, 374 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1954); Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 767 (1972); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); see also Note,
Aliens and Housing: Toward an Intermediate Level of Review, 2 GEo. IMMIGR. LJ. 351,
362-63 (1987).
14. The Court expresses its judicial deference by applying minimal judicial scrutiny
to these statutes. It has recognized that subjecting all federal classifications based on alien-
age to minimal judicial scrutiny results in Congress making rules that would be unconstitu-
tional if applied to citizens. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976); see also L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-16, at 281 (1978); C. GORDON & E.
GORDON, supra note 4, at ch. 4.3.
15. See generally Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Galvan v. Press,
347 U.S. 522 (1954): C. GORDON & E. GORDON, supra note 4, at ch. 4.3.
1988]
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subject to a successful challenge on these substantive grounds.1 6
Section Five presents such a case. To be sure, the judicial defer-
ence is useful and should be continued, but the Supreme Court
should limit its application where legislation, such as Section Five,
punishes U.S. citizens and alien spouses for exercising fundamen-
tal rights.1 7 Moreover, because the rationales underlying the
Court's judicial deference' lose their force when applied to depor-
tation hearings governed by Section Five, the Court should ana-
lyze this legislation with more than its traditional "toothless" re-
view of immigration statutes.1 9
The political branch or political question rationale was exempli-
fied by the Supreme Court in Galvan v. Press.20 It noted:
[A]ny policy toward aliens is virtually and intricately interwo-
ven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of
foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a re-
publican form of government. Such matters are so exclusively
entrusted to the political branches of government as to be
largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference."1
In Mathews v. Diaz, the Supreme Court added, "[tihe reasons
that preclude judicial review of political questions also dictate a
narrow standard of review of decisions made by Congress or the
President in the area of immigration and naturalization." 22 As ap-
plied to deportation hearings governed by Section Five, this rea-
soning is flawed in two respects.
First, in determining whether Section Five adheres to the due
process and equal protection mandates, it is doubtful the Court
16. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-37 (1982).
17. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE, § 11:4, at 535 (1978).
18. These rationales have received extensive criticism. See generally Comment, Peti-
tioning on Behalf of an Alien Spouse: Due Process Under the Immigration Laws, 74 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1747, 1763-70 (1986); Comment, Developments in the Law-Immigration
Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1419-23 (1983); L. TRIBE, supra
note 14, at 281-84.
19. Cf. Shyameshwar Das, Discrimination in Employment Against Aliens-The Im-
pact of the Constitution and Federal Civil Rights Law, 35 U. PITT. L. REV. 499, 536-40
(1974); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 281-84. The deference exhibited by the Court
towards the virtually unlimited power of Congress and the Executive Branch to regulate
immigration matters is in part due to a judicial reluctance to reconsider the principles and
rationales expounded in earlier decisions. See generally Galvan v. Press, 374 U.S. 522,
530-31 (1954); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 767 (1972); Compare C. GORDON &
E. GORDON, supra note 4, at ch. 4.3, with Comment, supra note 5, at 1115 (the Court will
not apply a strict scrutiny review even if Section Five unduly burdens the exercise of a
fundamental right). Moreover, this would not be the first time the Supreme Court over-
turned authority in an area which was in dire need of change. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of
Educ,, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
20. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
21. Id. at 531.
22. 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976).
[Vol. 25
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would "implicate our relations with foreign powers. 23 Section
Five only detrimentally affects the marriage and familial relation-
ship of the U.S. citizen or permanent resident and the alien
spouse.24 This section is unlike other immigration provisions of the
Act that could interfere with the federal government's power and
relationship with other countries if subjected to the Court's nor-
mal review. 5 Moreover, even if Section Five tangentially touches
upon the conduct of foreign relations, this alone should not be suf-
ficient to trigger the Court's judicial deference.
Second, analyzing Section Five under the Court's usual review
would not raise a political question. 6 Controversies that raise po-
litical questions, and thus avoid judicial review, raise issues which
the Constitution has exclusively committed to the other branches
of government, or which the judiciary is not well equipped to re-
solve.27 Although the Constitution explicitly empowers Congress
to deal with naturalization matters, it does not impose any limits
on the Court's jurisdiction in immigration cases.2 8 Moreover, the
Court could arguably determine the validity of federal legislation
in the immigration area under the analytical framework it nor-
mally employs when reviewing similar state legislation. 9 The po-
23. Several district courts have already considered Section Five's impact on the due
process rights of U.S. citizens and alien spouses without bringing into question our rela-
tions with the foreign country of the alien national involved. See e.g., Azizi v. Meese, Civil.
No. H87-957(AHN) (1988) (granting the American citizen and alien couple's preliminary
injunction in an action challenging the INS's enforcement of Section Five); Smith v. INS,
Civil No. 87-1988-C (1988).
24. See infra notes 71-100 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., INA § 101(a)(16); 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(16) (1982).
26. The issue of whether Section Five is constitutional under the due process and
equal protection clauses is not so purely "political" as to preclude judicial determination of
the rights of the parties. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
27. Id. at 217; Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (congressional and executive
authority to prescribe and regulate training and weaponry of National Guard precludes
any form of judicial regulations). For a blistering critique of the "political question" doc-
trine, see Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine? 85 YALE LJ. 597, 622
(1976). ("The 'Political Question' Doctrine, I conclude, is an unnecessary, deceptive pack-
aging of several established doctrines that has misled lawyers and courts to find in it things
that were never put there and make it far more than the sum of its parts.")
28. The Constitution provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power... [t]o estab-
lish a uniform Rule of Naturalization . . ." US. CONsT. art. I, sec. 8. cl. 4, but it is silent
on the subject of immigration. Early state statutes in the immigration area were declared
unconstitutional as invasions of the federal government's exclusive power to regulate for-
eign commerce. E.g., Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875); Henderson v. Mayor
of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 270 (1875). The constitutionality of the first immigration stat-
ute drafted by the federal government was later upheld on the same principle. The Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 596 (1884). Later, however, the Supreme Court held that the
power to regulate immigration was incident to national sovereignty and did not need to be
inferred from a particular clause in the Constitution. Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651,
659 (1892).
29. See Note, Adams v. Howerton: Avoiding Constitutional Challenges to Immigra-
tion Policies Through Judicial Deference, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L. Rav. 318, 325 (1983);
7
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litical question rationale is thus an untenable ground for applying
judicial deference to Section Five.
Another rationale advanced in support of the Court's judicial
deference towards federal statutes in the immigration area has ex-
isted since the latter part of the nineteenth century. In Nishumira
Ekiu v. United States,3 ° the Court explained the "sovereignty" ra-
tionale as follows:
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sover-
eign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essen-
tial to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners
within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and
upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.3'
Several commentators have criticized this reasoning on the ba-
sis that "it simply does not follow that a power inherent in the
sovereignty of the United States is not subject to constitutional
limits. '32 It is true that as a matter of international law, as the
maxim suggests, the federal government has the power to exclude
or deport aliens even if the alien's native country objects.33 How-
ever, as a matter of domestic law, the federal government is not
relieved of its duty to guarantee aliens who are involved in depor-
tation hearings the substantive protections and procedural safe-
guards normally afforded by our Constitution. 4 The U.S. Consti-
tution is the proper lens through which the Court must judge the
authority of Congress and the Executive Branch. To the extent
the sovereignty rationale provides that in immigration matters the
Constitution is subordinated to international law, it reflects an er-
ror of vision. 5 Thus, in general, this rationale would not provide a
strong foundation for the Court's "toothless" review of Section
Five.
An additional rationale stems from the Court's characterization
of the power of Congress and the Executive Branch in the immi-
gration area as "absolute," "unqualified," and "plenary." 36 The
Comment, Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1421. In the familiar langauge of
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217, there are "judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards" to determine whether Section Five deprives aliens who marry U.S. citizens or per-
manent residents during deportation hearings of the process due under the Constitution.
30. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
31. Id. at 659.
32. See Comment, Petitioning on Behalf of an Alien Spouse, supra note 18, at 1763;
Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens From Discriminatory Treatment by the National Gov-
ernment, 1977 Sup. Cr. REV. 275, 320.
33. See Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Permanent Res-
ident Alien: The Pre-1917 Cases, 68 YALE LJ. 1578, 1586-87 (1959).
34. See Rosberg, supra note 32, at 321.
35. See L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 283-84.
36. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893); Carlson v. Lan-
don, 342 U.S. 524, 534 (1952).
[Vol. 25
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characterization of a power as "plenary" does not necessarily im-
munize it from all judicial and constitutional restraints.37 For ex-
ample, the Court has qualified the vast power of Congress in im-
migration matters by requiring that its legislation observe the
procedural due process protections afforded to aliens in deporta-
tion hearings.38 In other areas, while the power of Congress to
regulate commerce has been termed "plenary," the Court has in-
terpreted this to mean that it will accord judicial deference only to
"regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitu-
tional prohibition." 9 In the same manner, the President's power
to conduct foreign affairs has been characterized as "plenary and
exclusive," yet the Court has made clear that this power "like
every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordina-
tion to the applicable provisions of the Constitution."4
It is doubtful that the plenary power of Congress to regulate the
admission and deportation of aliens justifies punishing the U.S.
citizen (or permanent resident) and alien spouse for exercising
their fundamental right to marriage and family association. There
is broad language in some U.S. Supreme Court decisions which
could be interpreted as providing such authority.,1 However, when
this language is viewed in the proper context and in light of subse-
quent cases, the better view would seem to be that courts should
not expand the scope of the plenary power rationale from its tradi-
tional application in such cases."2
The Supreme Court has also put forth the "right-privilege" rea-
soning.4 This rationale is based on the premise that an alien who
seeks an immigration benefit or privilege cannot obtain it unless
he complies with the congressional conditions under which it is
afforded. 4 However, over the years this doctrine has been modi-
fied by another principle which provides that an unconstitutional
condition cannot be raised to deprive or punish an individual for
37. See Comment, Petitioning on Behalf of an Alien Spouse, supra note 18, at 1747,
1764.
38. See generally The Japanese Immigration Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
39. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941); Comment, Petitioning on
Behalf of an Alien Spouse, supra note 18, at 1764.
40. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); see also
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953).
41. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); Jay
v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
42. See generally, K. DAvis, supra note 17.
43. See United States ex rel Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); Jay
v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956). See also H. Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62
CORNELL L. REv. 405 (1977).
44. Note, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Exclude Aliens, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
957, 976-77 (1982).
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exercising a fundamental right. 5 Moreover, the case law in the
immigration area analyzing the right-benefit rationale is of ques-
tionable validity.46 In fact, this justification would seem to support
the Court's abdication of its traditional judicial deference to fed-
eral immigration legislation if it found that a provision of Section
Five, such as the two-year foreign residency requirement, uncon-
stitutionally deprived aliens of a fundamental right.
In sum, the Supreme Court's rationales continue to justify its
judicial deference towards federal legislation in the immigration
area. However, these reasons do not offer a satisfactory explana-
tion for the Court's "toothless" review of all immigration statutes.
In particular, the rationales do not justify the Court's deference to
federal legislation in the immigration area that penalizes a U.S.
citizen (or permanent resident) and alien spouse for exercising a
fundamental right. Deportation hearings controlled by Section
Five penalize the U.S. citizen and alien spouse for exercising con-
stitutionally protected interests, such as the right to marry and
family association.' Thus, these rationales should not preclude
the Court from applying a standard of review more stringent than
the usual minimal scrutiny.
II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FIFrH AMENDMENT
A. Applicability of the Due Process Protections to
Deportation and Exclusion Hearings
Before engaging in a due process analysis of Section Five it is
important to understand the crucial distinction between the two
types of proceedings that immigration law has created for deter-
mining "which aliens can be denied the hospitality of the United
States: deportation hearings and exclusion hearings. ' 8 The depor-
tation hearing deals with an alien who is "within the United
States after an entry irrespective of its legality" but whose right to
remain in this country is questioned.49 On the other hand, the ex-
clusion hearing is the usual means of proceeding against an alien
who is outside the United States seeking admission into this coun-
try.50 The differences in the procedural protections accorded aliens
45. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law, 81 HARV L. REV. 1439, 1458-60 (1968); Stewart, The Reformation of Ameri-
can Administrative Law, 88 HARV L. REV. 1667 (1975).
46. See K. DAVIS, supra note 17.
47. See infra notes 77-90 & 212-18.
48. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25 (1982); See generally C. GORDON & H.
ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, at ch. 3.18.
49. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958).
50. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25 (1982).
[Vol. 25
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in deportation hearings versus exclusion hearings are significant.5 1
1. Deportation hearings-While Congress may establish the
grounds for deportation of aliens on virtually any substantive ba-
sis, the procedural safeguards in deportation hearings must com-
port with the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 2 One
procedure, long recognized to be protected by this clause, is a fair
decision-making process. This process is implemented before gov-
ernmental action is taken that directly impairs a person's life, lib-
erty or property.5 3 Accordingly, since the landmark Japanese Im-
migrant Case," the Supreme Court has consistently held that an
alien who has either legally or illegally entered the United States,
unlike an alien excluded at the border, is entitled to a fair hearing
before being deported.5 5 One court5s described the constitution-
ally-mandated requirements of fairness in deportation hearings as
follows:
The accused shall be notified of the nature of the charge against
him in time to meet it, . . . he shall have such an opportunity to
be heard, .... he may, if he chooses, cross examine the witnesses
against him .... he may have time and opportunity, after all the
evidence against him is produced and known to him, to produce
evidence and witnesses to refute it .... [T]he decision shall be
governed by and based upon the evidence at the hearing, and
that only; and ... the decision shall not be without substantial
evidence taken at the hearing to support it.
Later, Congress incorporated most of these basic requirements
of due process into the provisions of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act (INA).5 The statute mandates that an alien may be
deported only after being provided a hearing"8 where the govern-
ment bears the burden of proving deportability by "clear, unequiv-
51. See generally Maldonado-Sandoval v. INS, 518 F.2d 278, 280, n.3 (9th Cir.
1975).
52. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952). See generally IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURE, ch. 4.3a (1987).
53. See Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 553 (1942); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 262-63 (1969); Lassiter v. Dep't. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).
54. Korow Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903).
55. See also Sung Wong Yang v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
56. Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 F. 745, 747 (8th Cir. 1915).
57. INA § 242(b); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982). These statutory protections provide
the basic ingredients of a fair hearing and due process, which prior to 1952 had been
prescribed only by judicial fiat. See Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49-50 (1950). See
generally C. GORDON & E. GORDON, supra note 4, at ch. 5.6. The Supreme Court has not
yet determined the minimal constitutional protections that fair play requires. See Friendly,
Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1297 (1975). See also C. GORDON & H.
ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, at ch. 5.5.
58. The hearing is usually held near the alien's residence within the United States.
See, INA § 243(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1982).
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ocal, and convincing evidence." 5 He must be afforded reasonable
notice of the deportation hearing and be advised of the grounds
for deportation. 60 At the hearing, the alien may be represented by
counsel.6 He must be given "a reasonable opportunity to examine
the evidence against him, to present evidence in his own behalf,
and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government." 2
The alien also has available several substantive rights in a depor-
tation hearing including the right to designate the country of de-
portation; seek temporary withholding of deportation on persecu-
tion grounds; and apply for suspension of deportation, voluntary
departure, or for an adjustment of status.63
2. Exclusion hearings-In contrast, aliens involved in exclusion
hearings are governed by an entirely different set of rules.6"
Through the years, courts have made clear that Congress may
fashion any procedure it deems appropriate to aliens involved in
exclusion hearings. 65 Congress may impose conditions on aliens
who are seeking entry into this country that would not otherwise
withstand constitutional scrutiny if imposed on citizens. 66 For ex-
ample, aliens in exclusion hearings bear the burden of establishing
their admissibility into this country.67 There is no requirement
59. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966).
60. See INA § 242(b)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (1982).
61. See INA § 242(b)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (1982).
62. See INA § 242(b); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982) (emphasis added). See also Mat-
ter of H. 6 I & N Dec. 358 (1954). The deportation hearing must be conducted by an
immigration judge whose determination of deportation must be made on the record in the
proceeding before him. See INA § 101(b)(4); 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (b)(4) (1982); 8 C.F.R. §
242.8(a) (1988). The regulations also permit the alien to apply for an adjustment of status.
See, 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a) (1988); Matter of Vrettokas, 14 1 & N Dec. 593 (1974). If the
alien may apply for discretionary relief, it follows that he or she must be given the opportu-
nity to submit evidence in support of this application. See 8 C.F.R. 242.17(d) (1988). In
sum, the alien has a right to a reasonable opportunity to present an application for discre-
tionary relief and to a reasonable determination on such an application. See INS v.
Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 14 (1976). Cf. Wah v. INS, 386 F.2d 292 (Ist Cir. 1967); Rose v.
Woolwine, 344 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1965).
63. See generally INA § 244; 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982); INA § 245; 8 U.S.C. § 1255
(1982); INA § 246(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) (1982).
64. Although by statute these aliens are entitled to most of the procedural safeguards
accorded aliens in deportation hearings, the Constitution does not guarantee them these
procedures. See C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, at ch. 3.19; see also Com-
ment, Petitioning on Behalf of an Alien Spouse, supra note 18, at 1747.
65. See Comment, Petitioning on Behalf of an Alien Spouse, supra note 18, at 1747.
66. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); See also L. TRIBE, supra note 14,
at 281 (1978). For criticism of this view, see, Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration
Law, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 18-21 (1984); Note, Constitutional Limits on the Power to
Exclude Aliens, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 962-63 (1982); Comment, Developments in the
Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1286, 1322-24
(1983).
67. See generally C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note I, at ch. 3.20(d).
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that they be given advance notice of the charges brought against
them. 8 They are ineligible for the discretionary remedies of sus-
pension of deportation and voluntary departure. 8 In addition, if
ordered excluded, the alien is not allowed to select the country to
which he or she is to be deported. °
B. Constitutionally Protected Interests
The due process clause of the fifth amendment provides that
Congress shall not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."' 71 Due process guarantees "'the ag-
grieved party the opportunity to present his case and have its mer-
its fairly judged,' which requires 'some form of hearing before the
individual is finally deprived of a protected [liberty or property]
interest.' "72
In enacting Section Five, Congress undertook to pronounce on
the validity of marriages entered into by U.S. citizens or perma-
nent residents and aliens. 3 It determined that marriages entered
into before deportation hearings started were unlikely to be fraud-
ulent, and thus valid for immigration purposes.74 On the other
hand, Congress assumed that marriages entered into after depor-
tation hearings had commenced were inherently "shams," and
were not to be recognized for immigration purposes.75 Congress
added salt to the wound of couples who entered into valid mar-
riages by deporting aliens in this latter category, and in imposing
a two-year foreign residency requirement for obtaining an immi-
gration benefit based on such a marriage.76 Section Five, as ap-
plied to deportation hearings, deprives the U.S. citizen or perma-
nent resident and alien spouse of two intertwined constitutionally
protected interests.
First, the U.S. citizen and alien spouse have a "liberty" interest
and an undeniable stake in their marriage, and in the immigration
68. See, In re Salazar, 17 I & N Dec. 167, 169 (1979).
69. Id.
70. See generally INA § 106; 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1982). For an extensive list of
authorities and commentators opposed to this curtailment of the aliens's right to a fair
hearing, see generally C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, at ch. 3.182.4, n. 13.
71. U.S. CONsT. amend. V; see generally C. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M.
TUSHNET. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 900-924 (1986).
72. Ali v. INS, 661 F. Supp. 1234, 1249 (D. Mass. 1986) (citing Logan v. Zimmer-
man Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433 (1982)).
73. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment in
Smith v. INS, No. 87-1988-C 21-23.
74. INA § 245(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(e); INA § 204(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(h); see also,
supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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benefits that accompany the relationship.7" In undertaking to pro-
nounce on the validity of the marriage, the government threatens
fundamental aspects of the marital relationship. 8 In particular,
when the Immigration and Nationalization Service (INS),
through the application of Section Five, presumes a marriage en-
tered into after a deportation hearing has commenced to be a
sham, it deprives the married couple of their fundamental right to
make intimate decisions about their marriage and family life to-
gether.7 9 For example, since couples are prevented from present-
ing evidence on the bona fides of their marriage, it is unlikely that
the alien will receive an immigration benefit based on this rela-
tionship. The foreign residency requirement80 also forces some
couples to live apart throughout this period, and thus inevitably
leads to the disruption of the couple's marriage and family associ-
ation. Moreover, these interests are also destroyed by the fact
that, under Section Five, both the immigration judge and the At-
torney General may not consider evidence of the bona fides of a
marriage entered into after the deportation hearing has started.8'
Accordingly, Section Five deprives couples who enter into valid
marriages of their liberty interests in marriage and family
association.
Second, couples affected by Section Five have a "property" in-
terest in petitioning the government to have the alien spouse de-
clared an immediate relative, and ultimately to secure an immi-
gration benefit based on the marriage."2 This conclusion is
supported by the congressional commitment to family unity in
adopting the immediate relative status provision, 3 and in particu-
lar, Section Five.84 In attempting to have an alien declared an im-
mediate relative, the INA and the INS regulations guarantee the
U.S. citizen (or permanent resident) and alien spouse the right to:
(1) apply for an adjustment of status; 5 (2) present evidence on
their own behalf and cross-examine adverse witnesses;86 (3) rebut
77. See Ali, 661 F. Supp. at 1245-46 n.6; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 752
(1982); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982).
78. Ali, 661 F. Supp. at 1246 n.6; see also Stokes v. INS, 393 F. Supp. 24, 29
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
79. See Azizi v. Meese, Civil No. H87-957 (1988); Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Sup-
port of their Motion for Summary Judgment in Smith v. INS, No 87-1988-C 21-23.
80. See INA § 204(h); 8 U.S.C. § 1154(h); see also supra note 7 and accompanying
text.
81. See supra notes 7 & 8 and accompanying text.
82. All, 661 F. Supp. at 1246 n.6.
83. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 37, 38, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1691, 1692; see also Ali v. INS, 661 F. Supp. at 1246 n.6.
84. S. REP. No. 491, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 8 (1986).
85. See generally INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1982).
86. INA § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982); 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b).
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derogatory information in the record;87 and (4) have the immigra-
tion judge's decision be based only on the evidence presented at
the deportation hearing.88 Section Five infringes on the couple's
property interest to petition the government by depriving the
couple of the twin opportunities to present evidence establishing
the bona fides of their marriage, and to apply for an adjustment of
the alien's status.89 Congress, therefore, has created the right for
the couple to submit and substantiate their marriage, and this en-
titlement invokes the protections afforded by due process.9
C. Procedural Due Process Analysis
Procedural due process requires fairness in determining whether
to grant immigration benefits to an alien based on his or her mar-
riage to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident.9 1 In determining
whether the procedures provided by Section Five meet the essen-
tial standards of fairness under the due process clause, the timing
87. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(2) (1988).
88. INA § 101(b)(4); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (1982); 8 C.F.R. § 242.8(a) (1988).
89. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
90. Ali v. INS, 661 F. Supp. 1234, 1246 n.6. (D. Mass. 1986).
Aliens who marry after the commencement of exclusion hearings, however, have no lib-
erty interest in the marriage and family relationship, or in petitioning the government. See
supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text. Under Section Five, an alien who marries a
U.S. citizen or permanent resident during an exclusion hearing is not given an opportunity
to prove the bona fides of his or her marriage. See IMFA § 5 (amending INA § 245; 8
U.S.C. § 1255 (1982)). The discretionary remedy of adjustment of status based on these
marriages may not be granted to these aliens. A visa petition on their behalf for immediate
relative or "preference" status may not be obtained until they have resided outside the
country for two years after the marriage. Id. Section Five creates, in form and in fact, an
irrebuttable presumption that the marriage is a "sham" and thus makes the marriage inva-
lid for immigration law purposes. See Comment, supra note 5, at 1106-08.
This exclusion proceeding can hardly be considered a "fair hearing" since this provision
does not allow an immigration judge to consider and evaluate competent evidence. Cf.
Gung You v. Nagle, 34 F.2d 848, 851-53 (9th Cir. 1929). As discussed earlier, however, an
alien seeking entry into the United States is not entitled to procedural due process and
Congress "can fashion any procedures it deems appropriate to determine whether an en-
trant is admissible." See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text. As the Supreme Court
succinctly stated in Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953):
It is true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may
be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness
encompassed in due process of law .... But an alien on the threshold of initial
entry stands on a different footing: Whatever the procedure authorized by Con-
gress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.
While commentators have consistently denounced this holding, it is presently the prevailing
view. See, e.g., 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11:5 (1978); Comment,
supra note 66, at 1322-24. Thus, although Section Five appears to be procedurally defi-
cient, it would pass constitutional muster as applied to exclusion hearings because this "is
due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206, 212 (1953).
91. Azizi v. INS, Civil No. H87-957AHN (1988) (granting U.S. citizen and alien
couple's preliminary injunction in an action challenging the INS's enforcement of Section
Five); Cf. Ali v. INS, 661 F. Supp. at 1245.
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and nature of the hearing must be balanced against the competing
private and governmental interests at stake. 2 Under the balancing
test set out in Mathews v. Eldridge,93 the court must consider: (1)
the interest at stake for the individual; (2) the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of the interest through the procedures used as well as
the probable value of additional or different procedural safe-
guards; and (3) the interest of the government in using the cur-
rent procedures rather than additional or different procedures. Al-
though this provision is in some respects capable of withstanding
judicial scrutiny, in other respects it is patently unconstitutional. 4
1. Private interests affected-The procedures provided by Sec-
tion Five place an alien who has entered into a valid marriage
after the initiation of a deportation hearing in the proverbial
Catch-22. As discussed earlier, the liberty and property interests
implicated by Section Five are of substantial importance." When
the government seeks to burden and adversely pronounce on the
validity of a marriage, it implicates fundamental interests and im-
pinges on "interests of basic importance in our society."98 More-
92. See generally Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Lan-
don v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
93. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
94. Aliens who marry U.S. citizens or permanent residents before deportation or ex-
clusion hearings have started can hardly complain of a due process violation. Under Section
Five, aliens who marry prior to the commencement of exclusion or deportation hearings are
provided the opportunity to prove the validity of their marriages. See generally supra notes
6 & 7 and accompanying text. If the alien succeeds in making this showing, the Attorney
General may adjust his or her status, and grant the alien a two-year conditional residency
status. See supra note 6. Unlike aliens who marry after the initiation of exclusion or depor-
tation hearings, these aliens may remain in this country, and eventually obtain permanent
resident status based on such a marriage. See supra notes 6 & 7 and accompanying text.
Section Five, in this context, provides the procedural safeguards generally afforded aliens
in exclusion and deportation hearings. Accordingly, these aliens would be hard pressed to
claim a procedural due process violation.
Moreover, aliens who marry after exclusion proceedings have commenced have no
grounds for claiming a due process violation. See supra note 90. As discussed earlier, Sec-
tion Five deprives these aliens of no constitutionally protected liberty interest. See supra
notes 64-70 & 90 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Stokes v. INS, 393 F. Supp. 24, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (procedures em-
ployed by INS to investigate 1-130 petitions are subject to judicial scrutiny because they
infringe upon the fundamental right to marriage); see also Ali v. INS, 661 F. Supp. at
1246 n.6. These aliens stand to lose the right to remain with or to rejoin their immediate
family, "a right that ranks high among the interests of the individual." Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S 21, 34 (1982). These aliens may also "lose the right to stay and live
and work in this land of freedom." Id. quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154
(1945); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 503-04 (1977) (plu-
rality opinion); cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978); see also Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment, Smith v. INS, No. 87-
1988-C.
96. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment at
21, Smith v. INS No. 87-1988-C, (citing Boddie v. Conn., 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971)).
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over, the couple's interest in petitioning the government is ad-
versely affected by Section Five, which prevents the alien from
presenting, and the immigration judge and Attorney General from
considering, evidence on the bona fides of the marriage.97 How-
ever, in order to protect these interests the couple is constitution-
ally guaranteed procedures that allow them to prove the bona
fides of their marriage during deportation hearings. 98 This means
that they must be provided with a full and fair hearing on the
issue of deportability, an opportunity to present evidence on the
bona fides of their marriage and a reasonable opportunity to apply
for any discretionary remedies, such as an adjustment of status.9
Since Section Five deprives them of these procedures, it destroys
their constitutionally protected interests in marriage, family asso-
ciation, and in petitioning the government. Section Five thus ren-
ders the deportation hearing unfair.100
2. Erroneous deprivations-Consideration must be given to the
risk that an alien who enters into a bona fide marriage after the
commencement of deportation hearings will be erroneously de-
ported due to the procedural deficiencies of Section Five.101 The
risk of an erroneous deportation decision is real and severalfold.
Section Fi e substantially burdens these fundamental interests of the U.S. citizen or per-
manent re ient and alien spouse. By essentially creating an irrebuttable presumption of
marriag o  .ud (see supra note 11 and accompanying text), Section Five is sure to disrupt
marriages and family relationships. Section Five also burdens these interests by imposing a
two-year foreign residency requirement without providing the alien a prior opportunity to
be heard on the validity of his marriage. Id.
97. Section Five deprives couples who marry after the deportation hearing has com-
menced of their constitutionally protected interest in petitioning the government to have
the alien declared the U.S. citizen's immediate relative. The Constitution and the INA
guarantees these aliens a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on their behalf. See
INA § 242(b); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982). By not allowing aliens who marry during depor-
tation hearings to prove the bona fides of their marriage, however, Section Five renders this
procedural safeguard meaningless. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. More-
over, although the INA guarantees these aliens an opportunity to apply for an adjustment
of status, Section Five drives a wedge through this procedure by forbidding both the immi-
gration judge from considering and the Attorney General from granting permanent resi-
dent status to aliens who marry during deportation hearings. See generally INA § 245; 8
U.S.C. § 1255 (Supp. 1987). Even aliens who marry prior to the initiation of exclusion
hearings, and who are not protected by the Constitution, receive these procedural safe-
guards. Accordingly, Section Five effectively blocks important procedures that guarantee a
fair hearing to aliens who otherwise would have an opportunity to present evidence on the
bona fides of their marriage, and who eventually would be able to apply for an adjustment
of status, had they fortuitously married prior to the initiation of deportation hearings. See
supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 52-63 and 82-90 and accompanying text. Cf. Rose v. Wool-
wine, 344 F.2d 993, 995-96 (4th Cir. 1965).
99. See supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
100. The INA also recognizes that more may be at issue in these proceedings than
the bare question of deportability. See Rose, 344 F.2d at 996.
101. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 544 (1985).
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Couples who enter into valid marriages during deportation
hearings are erroneously deprived of their liberty interest in living
together as a married couple in this country.10 2 Depriving the U.S.
citizen (or permanent resident) and alien spouse of their liberty
and property interests without providing any procedure for deter-
mining whether their marriage is bona fide for immigration law
purposes inevitably leads to erroneous decisions.03 Minimal proce-
dural safeguards to protect couples from being erroneously de-
prived of their fundamental interests are necessary. For example,
a limited pre-deprivation inquiry into whether there are facts to
support a reasonable probability that the alien married to circum-
vent the immigration laws would effectuate the congressional pur-
pose in deterring sham marriages, and serve to minimize the risk
of erroneous deportation decisions.'0° Accordingly, if these depor-
tation hearings are to ensure fairness, 0 5 they must provide aliens
with an opportunity to present evidence on the bona fides of their
marriage, regardless of when the marriage takes place. 06
3. Government interest-The third factor of the Mathews bal-
ancing test requires an evaluation of the governmental interest
and the burden in using the procedures established by Section
Five, rather than additional or different procedures."0 7 Providing
aliens who marry after deportation hearings with minimal proce-
dures for determining whether their marriages are bona fide will
further the congressional purpose in enacting Section Five. More-
over, this proposal does not present an administrative or financial
102. Even though the main purpose of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amend-
ments is to deter couples from engaging in sham marriages, Section Five adversely impacts
on the "law-abiding majority" who enter into bona fide marriages. See infra notes 231-38
and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text.
104. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judg-
ment at 23-27, Smith v. INS, No. 87-1988-C.
105. The prospect of error is also enhanced because Section Five deprives aliens who
marry during deportation hearings of an opportunity to apply for an adjustment of status.
Rather than focusing on the validity of the marriage, Section Five looks to the timing of
the marriage. See infra notes 257-61 and accompanying text. While the motives of aliens
who marry during deportation hearings may be suspect, it does not follow that they all
have fraudulent intentions. See Comment, supra note 5, at 1089. Accordingly, to avoid
erroneous decisions, aliens in deportation hearings must be allowed the opportunity to pre-
sent evidence on the bona fides of their marriage and to adjust their status regardless of
when the wedding ceremony takes place.
106. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 36 (1982).
Those aliens who fortuitously marry prior to the commencement of exclusion or deporta-
tion hearings are provided this opportunity. Thus, the risk of error in this context is slim.
However, erroneous deportation decisions will be rendered with respect to aliens who marry
after the initiation of such hearings because they are deprived of the opportunity to present
evidence establishing the bona fides of their marriages.
107. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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burden on the government.
First, the congressional purpose in enacting the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendments was threefold. As the legislative
history of Section Five indicates, Congress was highly interested
in deterring immigration related marriage fraud,108 providing ben-
efits to aliens who enter into valid marriages, and having deporta-
tion hearings reach accurate and reliable decisions.10 9 These inter-
ests would al be served by providing those aliens involved in
deportation hearings with an opportunity to present evidence on
the validity of their marriages even if it was entered into after the
initiation of such hearings. By so doing, Congress could continue
to combat sham marriages by providing benefits to only those
aliens who have entered into legitimate marriages with U.S. citi-
zens or permanent residents.
Second, providing aliens who are adversely affected by Section
Five with procedures for determining the bona fides of their mar-
riage imposes no additional administrative burden on the govern-
ment. The pre-Section Five administrative procedures provided
aliens with an opportunity to present evidence on the bona fides of
their marriage, and served to effectuate the government's interest
in deterring sham marriages.111 In enacting Section Five, Con-
108. See H.R. REP. No. 906, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1986); S. REP. No. 491, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1986).
109. See S. REP. No. 491, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1986).
110. INS investigators focus on the intent of the parties at the time the marriage is
celebrated in determining whether to grant an alien permanent resident status based on
such marriage. See generally Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1975); Whetstone v.
INS, 561 F.2d 1303, 1309 (9th Cir. 1977); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S 604 (1953);
Danilov & Nerheim, supra note 4, at 310. When an immigration petition based on an
alien's marriage to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident is submitted, the INS currently
employs the following three methods in determining whether the marriage is valid: (1)
Parallel marriage fraud interviews, (2) Post-marital supervision of the couple, and (3)
"Bedcheck" investigations. See generally Comment, Petitioning on Behalf of an Alien
Spouse: Due Process Under the Immigration Laws, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1747, 1750-53
(1986); Fraudulent Marriage Hearing, supra note 1, at 25-31 (discussion of investigatory
methods employed by Consular Offices abroad); E. HARWOOD, IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW: IL-
LEGAL ALIENS AND IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT 143-67 (1986).
While the immigration petition is pending, the INS will conduct a parallel marriage
fraud interview. See Fraudulent Marriage Hearing, supra note 1, at 28. The alien and his
or her spouse while in separate rooms are simultaneously asked a parallel series of ques-
tions about many aspects of the marital relationship. See Comment, The Marriage Viabil-
ity Requirement: Is It Viable?, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 89, 98 (1980). These questions are
designed to elicit discrepancies in the couple's answers. See Fraudulent Marriage Hearing,
supra note 1, at 61; but see, Danilov & Nerheim, supra note 4, at 311. For example, the
spouses may be asked where and when they met, whether correspondence is available show-
ing that the couple maintained contact while the petition was being processed, details about
their marriage ceremony, what gifts they have given each other since the wedding cere-
mony, the decor of their residence, the division of the household chores, each spouse's fa-
vorite activity, or simply what they each had for breakfast on the morning of the interview.
See C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, at ch. 2.18; A. FRAGOMEN, A. DEL REY
& S. BERNSEN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND BUSINESS 11-40 (1986); Roberts, Sex and the Im-
1988]
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gress did not overturn these procedures. Rather, it delayed the
availability of these administrative procedures with respect to
aliens who marry during deportation hearings. Upon satisfaction
of the two-year foreign residency requirement, the returning alien
is provided the opportunity to establish the bona fides of his mar-
riage via these procedures.' Therefore, providing aliens the op-
migration Laws, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 9, 40 (1976); Note, The Constitutionality of the
INS Sham Marriage Investigation Policy, 99 HARv. L. Rav. 1238, 1239-42 (1986);
Danilov & Nerheim, supra note 4, at 311. The couple may also be interrogated on more
intimate matters, such as the method of birth control used, and the couple's sexual conduct.
See generally Note, supra note 66.
After the interview, if it is found that the couple does not commonly share or know what
a married couple is reasonably expected to share, or if the alien has a particularly weak
claim, the INS examiners have several options. They may persuade the U.S. citizen or
permanent resident spouse to "voluntarily" withdraw the petition. See Danilov & Nerheim,
supra note 4, at 311; E. HARWOOD, supra, at 153. Or, as will be discussed in more depth,
the examiners may deny the immigration petition, and institute deportation hearings
against the alien. In any event, the INS examiners may send the file to the fraud unit for
further post-marital supervision of the couple.
At this second stage of the investigative process, the INS investigator's task is, in theory,
to uncover information that will either support a grant or denial of the immigration peti-
tion. See E. HARWOOD, supra, at 154. Investigators, who have broad discretion, may inter-
view the couple's neighbors, landlords, friends and relatives to verify that the couple
cohabitates and maintains an appearance of wedlock. See E. HARWOOD, supra, at 154. The
civil registry or church records may be reviewed to determine if one of the parties has an
existing marriage. See Fraudulent Marriage Hearing, supra note 1, at 27. Income tax
returns, insurance policies, employment applications, bank statements, property title docu-
ments and the like are sometimes checked to determine if the spouses claim each other as
dependents or beneficiaries, or if they hold joint property. See E. HARWOOD, supra, at 154.
Finally, INS records are checked when investigators suspect the citizen or permanent resi-
dent has been previously involved in attempting to commit marriage fraud. Id. at 155.
The third method the INS resorts to is a "bedcheck." At this stage, the investigator's
main aim is to determine if the couple is in fact living together as husband and wife. See E.
HARWOOD, supra, at 154-55. The standard procedure during a "bedcheck" is first to ascer-
tain if the alien and his or her spouse live in the same dwelling. If the alien is absent the
investigators may ask the citizen spouse to show them the absent spouse's clothing, and
they sometimes check the absent spouse's dirty clothes or personal effects. The investigators
make sure that the clothes are the alien spouse's right size, for the clothes may belong to
the citizen's "real" spouse. Lastly, they look for evidence of whether or not the couple
sleeps under the same roof.
If these investigatory procedures reveal objective evidence of the couple's fraudulent re-
lationship, the INS may deny the couple's immigration petition and commence deportation
hearings against the alien. See generally 1A C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 4.7d (1987); see also Matter of T, 8 I & N Dec. 493, 496 (BIA
1959). At the deportation hearing, the government generally shoulders the burden of prov-
ing that the alien is deportable. The INS may meet its burden of establishing the couple's
fraudulent relationship with evidence that: (1) a marriage broker arranged the marriage;
(2) the couple was not sufficiently acquainted prior to the marriage; (3) there is great
disparity in the spouses' ages, cultures or religious ties; (4) the alien paid the U.S. citizen
or permanent resident spouse to participate in the marriage and to file the immigration
petition; (5) the alien and his or her spouse never lived together after they married; or (6)
the couple did not intend to continue the marriage relationship (e.g., a prenuptial agree-
ment to this affect). See Danilov & Nerheim, supra note 4, at 311-19; Fraudulent Mar-
riage Hearing, supra note 1, at 29.
111. See supra note 7.
20
California Western Law Review, Vol. 25 [2015], No. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol25/iss1/2
MARRIAGE FRAUD AMENDMENT
portunity to be heard prior to, rather than after, depriving them of
their implicated liberty and property interests would not impose
additional burdens on the government.
Third, providing aliens with an opportunity to present evidence
on the bona fides of their marriage during deportation hearings
would not otherwise alter the character of the proceeding."' At
the hearing, the immigration judge is determining whether the
alien should be deported, or whether there are equitable factors,
such as a marriage to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident, that
would militate against deportation. The evidence that will be in-
troduced by aliens who marry after the commencement of depor-
tation hearings to establish the bona fides of their marriage would
be very similar to the evidence that aliens who marry prior to the
initiation of deportation and exclusion hearings would be
presenting. 113
Fourth, the federal government also has an interest in ensuring
that deportation decisions be made as economically and expedi-
tiously as possible. 4 A limited inquiry into the bona fides of the
alien's marriage, however, would not impose an additional finan-
cial burden on the government. As discussed previously, an alien
adversely affected by Section Five will be provided with a hearing
on the bona fides of his marriage after he completes his two-year
foreign residency requirement. This provision has the effect of de-
ferring, and not removing, the cost of the hearing to the govern-
ment.x15 Therefore, the proposed pre-deprivation hearing would
not impose insurmountable administrative or financial obstacles on
the government.
112. In fact, this would diminish the prospect of an erroneous deportation decision.
See Comment, supra note 5, at 1106.
113. Congress has allowed aliens who marry prior to the commencement of deporta-
tion and exclusion hearings to rely on objective indices of the bona fides of the marriage in
establishing their right to remain in or enter this country. See S. REP. No. 491, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess 5-6 (1986). See also supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text. In addition, the
immigration judges are well-versed in the evidentiary standards involved in deportation
hearings, so allowing these aliens to present evidence of the validity of their marriages will
protect these individual interests and not produce additional burdens on the government.
Extending this opportunity to present evidence to aliens who marry after becoming involved
in deportation hearings would cure the procedural deficiencies of Section Five.
114. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982); see also Comment, Develop-
ments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1390-95.
115. The legislative history of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments sup-
ports this conclusion. The Congressional Budget Office reported to the Senate and House
Committees that enactment of S. 2270, which contained no Section Five counterpart; or
H.R. 3737, which included Section Five, "would result in no net costs to the federal gov-
ernment and in no costs to state and local governments." See S. REP. No. 491, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 14 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 906, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1986); see also Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 26, Smith v. INS,
No. 87-1988-C.
19881
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4. Conclusion of the due process analysis-The dispositive
question that a court will face is whether the Mathews balancing
test dictates that under a due process analysis, aliens who marry
U.S. citizens or permanent residents during deportation hearings
must be provided the opportunity to establish the bona fides of
their marriage.11 6 A court's function will be to determine whether
the procedures provided by Section Five meet the "fundamental
fairness" requirement of the due process clause, and not to impose
procedures that simply displace congressional choices of policy.117
The determination that a pre-deprivation hearing is required be-
cause Section Five deprives aliens who marry after the initiation
of deportation hearings of due process will be in keeping with this
limitation. 18 Section Five deprives these aliens of the fair proce-
dures guaranteed by the fifth amendment." 9 The onerous burden
on the alien's liberty and property interests combined with the
substantial risk that erroneous deportation decisions will be ren-
dered weigh heavily in favor of a pre-deprivation minimal inquiry
into the bona fides of the alien's marriage. Moreover, because the
alien is already involved in deportation hearings, his production of
evidence on the bona fides of the marriage would not create insur-
mountable administrative and fiscal burdens on the government."'
In finding Section Five procedurally deficient as applied to these
deportation hearings, a court would thus be reaffirming the princi-
ple that, although Congress may provide for the deportation of
aliens on virtually any substantive ground, the procedures at such
deportation hearings must comport with the fifth amendment's
mandate of due process. 21
116. The Supreme Court has suggested that in situations where the private interests
are at their strongest, the government's interests at their weakest, and the risk of error at
their peak, the due process clause is violated and the appropriate procedural safeguards
must be provided. See Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981).
117. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-35 (1982).
118. The Court would not necessarily have to decide what procedural protections
would have to be provided at the pre-deprivation hearing. Rather, it could remand the case
to the lower court to determine the contours of the hearing. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia,
459 U.S. 21, 32-36 (1982).
119. See supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
120. In fact, Section Five increases the administrative burdens and inconvenience by
requiring a hearing two years later where the alien will be allowed to prove the bona fides
of the marriage. See Comment, supra note 5, at 1106.
121. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954); see also Comment, Develop-
ments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1384.
It has been suggested that Section Five could withstand a procedural due process chal-
lenge by aliens in deportation hearings because this provision "does not directly interfere
with the procedural due process afforded aliens in these proceedings." See supra note 5, at
1104, However, the validity of the alien's marriage to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident,
even if entered into after the commencement of deportation proceedings, is critical and
decisive of the alien's claim to remain in the United States. See supra notes 71-90 and
accompanying text. The related contention that it is proper to allow some aliens who are
[Vol. 25
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III. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
The fifth amendment prohibits the federal government from en-
acting statutes which deny any person the equal protection of the
laws.1 22  The term "person" in the amendment encompasses
involved in exclusion hearings, but not those involved in deportation hearings, to establish
the bona -fides of their marriage is ironic when it is understood that all aliens involved in
deportation hearings, regardless of when their marriage takes place, have a constitutionally
guaranteed right to be heard. Moreover, the determination of whether the alien's marriage
is valid for immigration law purposes can be made during deportation hearings, but only if
the alien is provided an opportunity to be heard. See generally Rose v. Woolwine, 344 F.2d
993 (4th Cir. 1965). Unfortunately, Section Five deprives these aliens of this opportunity.
It has also been argued that Section Five is constitutional as applied to deportation hear-
ings since it is a substantive change in congressional policy in the immigration area. See
Comment, supra note 5, at 1104. This argument is premised on the general principle that
the congressional power to establish deportation grounds is virtually limitless. See generally
C. GORDON & E. GORDON, supra note 4, at ch. 4.3. Thus, the argument goes, in enacting
Section Five, Congress indicated that an alien's marriage to a citizen or permanent resident
of the United States after the commencement of deportation hearings is a ground for de-
portation, and is no longer a basis for preventing an alien's deportation via an adjustment
of status. See Comment, supra note 5, at 1104. This argument is seriously flawed.
The Supreme Court has rejected a similar argument in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). In so doing, Justice White, writing for the majority,
stated:
The point is straightforward: the Due Process Clause provides that certain sub-
stantive rights-life, liberty, and property---cannot be deprived except pursuant to
constitutionally adequate procedures. The categories of substance and procedure
are distinct. Were the rule otherwise, the Clause would be reduced to a mere
tautology. "Property" cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its depri-
vation any more than can life or liberty. The right to due process "is conferred,
not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the legislature may
elect not to confer a property interest ... it may not constitutionally authorize the
deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural
safeguards."
Id. at 541 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974)). Section Five presents a
similar case. As discussed earlier, Congress has elected to confer property interests to aliens
who marry U.S. citizens or permanent residents. See supra notes 73-90. The Supreme
Court has made clear that deportation hearings must provide these aliens with the basic
ingredients of a fair hearing, and must conform with the constitutional mandate of proce-
dural due process. See generally C. GORDON & E. GORDON, supra note 4, at ch. 4.3.
Aliens involved in deportation, hearings have a constitutionally and statutorily protected
right to present evidence on the bona fides of their marriage and at least a statutorily
protected right to adjust their status on the basis of a marriage to a U.S. citizen or perma-
nent resident. See supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text. Section Five, however, de-
prives aliens and U.S. citizens of their liberty and property interests in marriage, family
association, and in petitioning the government "without appropriate procedural safe-
guards." See supra notes 73-90 and accompanying text. Accordingly, even if these proce-
dural safeguards could be statutorily changed by Congress, an alien is still constitutionally
entitled to these protections under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See
Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 470 U.S. at 542; cf. Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156,
173-76 (1974). (Although members of a class action formed under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(1) are not entitled to the statutorily-mandated individual notice of the class suit,
they are constitutionally guaranteed "reasonable notice.")
122. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The constitutional guarantees of substantive due process
and equal protection of the laws are two analytical frameworks the Supreme Court em-
ploys in analyzing legislation that intrudes upon individual liberty and property interests.
See generally Strickman, Marriage, Divorce and the Constitution, 22 B.C.L. REv. 935
1988]
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United States citizens, as well as aliens.12 The equal protection
principle, however, does not require that legislation treat every
person the same in all circumstances; it only mandates that per-
sons "similarly situated" be treated equally.12 4 The U.S. Supreme
Court has devised a three-tiered standard for determining the va-
lidity of federal legislation that is challenged as denying equal
protection.28
At the first tier, a statutory classification is generally measured
against the minimum scrutiny test.12 6 Under this analysis, the fed-
eral statute is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the
classification created by the legislation is "rationally related" to a
legitimate government interest. 27 This relatively relaxed standard
of review reflects the Court's awareness that the drawing of lines,
which inevitably create different classes of individuals, is a pecu-
liar legislative branch function. 28 The Court presumes that im-
provident decisions made by Congress will eventually be rectified
by the democratic process. 29
(1981); Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REv.
1156 (1980) [hereinafter The Constitution and the Family]. The fifth amendment ex-
pressly guarantees due process, and the courts have interpreted this clause as nplicitly
guaranteeing the equal protection of the laws. See, e.g., Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282,
288-97 (1979); see also Comment Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1418 n. 123.
Even though the Court generally treats them as distinct modes of analysis, it has done little
to illuminate the distinctions. See The Constitution and the Family, supra, at 1193. The
judicial scrutiny applied in substantive due process cases is theoretically different despite
the Court's use of language similar to that found in equal protection cases. See e.g.,
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 385-88 (1978); see also The Constitution and the Fam-
ily, supra, at 1194. In general, nevertheless, if a statutory classification does not comply
with the mandates of equal protection it will likewise not be consistent with substantive due
process guarantees. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (classification
which served to penalize the fundamental right to travel violated both the equal protection
and due process clauses); see also Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 385-88; Kriebel v. Hein, 429 U.S.
288 (1977).
123. See Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 370 (1971); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33, 39 (1915).
124. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (the
equal protection clause "is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should
be treated alike."); see also Comment, Intermediate Equal Protection Scrutiny of Welfare
Laws That Deny Subsistence, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1547 (1984).
125. See generally Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-441 (discussing the current structure
of equal protection analysis); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1436-1536,
1601 (1988); The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1188 (1980).
126. See generally Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981); Califano, 443
U.S. at 288-293; San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973).
127. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-177 (1980);
San Antonio School Dist., 411 U.S. at 40-41; Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767
(1977); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 304-06 (1976).
128. The minimum scrutiny test is generally applicable to social and economic legis-
lation. See Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976).
129. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 ("the Constitution presumes that even improvi-
dent decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.")
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The Court has also established a "second tier" of more intrusive
and stringent judicial review known as strict scrutiny."'a Under
this test, if a classification impinges upon a "fundamental"
right'31 or involves a "suspect" class,132 it is subjected to the
strictest of judicial scrutiny. 3 3 To pass muster under strict scru-
tiny, the government must establish that the legislative classifica-
tion: (1) is necessary to promote a compelling governmental inter-
est, and (2) is narrowly tailored so that there are no less
restrictive alternatives in meeting such an interest.'3' The govern-
ment shoulders a heavy burden of justifying the classification, and
the courts will closely scrutinize the statute in light of the govern-
mental interests at stake. 35
Since 1976, the third tier of review, which falls somewhere be-
tween minimum and strict scrutiny, has become a regular part of
the Court's equal protection analysis.' 6 Legislative classifications
based on gender and illegitimacy have generally triggered this
mid-level scrutiny.13 7 In recent years, however, a growing range of
cases involving classifications other than gender and illegitimacy,
and numerous "important" although not "fundamental" interests
have triggered this heightened level of review.'38 Under this test, a
classification fails unless the government shows that it is "substan-
tially related" to an important governmental interest. 139 Moreover,
in applying this test, unlike minimum scrutiny review, the Court
will not hypothesize findings of fact that would link the classifica-
130. See The Constitution and the Family, supra note 122, at 1188 and cases cited
therein.
131. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (fundamental right to mar-
riage); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (fundamental right to interstate
travel); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150-55 (1973) (fundamental right to abortion). How-
ever, the mere prospect that a statute discourages an individual from engaging in constitu-
tionally protected activity is not enough to trigger the strict scrutiny test. See, e.g., Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).
132. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); McLaughlin
v. Fla., 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
133. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634.
134. Shapiro, 394 U.S at 634.
135. See generally Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Hunter v. Erick-
son, 393 U.S. 385, 391-93 (1969).
136. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying mid-level scrutiny to a gen-
der classification); see also Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-224 (1982) (classification of
children of illegal aliens); L. TRIBE, supra note 125, at 1601.
137. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (gender classifica-
tion); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982) (illegitimacy classification).
138. See, e.g., Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1981) (applying heightened level of re-
view to school legislation which classified the children of illegal aliens); see also L. TRIBE,
supra note 125, at 1601.
139. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 ("A gender classification fails unless it is sub-
stantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest.").
19881
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tion in question to an articulated legislative purpose.110
A. Strict Scrutiny
1. Suspect class-In San Antonio School District v. Rodri-
guez,141 the U.S. Supreme Court identified a "suspect" class, gen-
erally entitled to the protection of strict scrutiny, as one "saddled
with such, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerless..
ness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process. '"142
Aliens are a quintessential example of a group that has long
been subjected to purposeful unequal treatment. Legislative classi-
fications based on alienage are thus generally considered "sus-
pect" and subject to strict scrutiny.143 However, under current
law, only state classifications based on alienage are analyzed
under strict judicial scrutiny.144 On the other hand, due to the
broad power of Congress in the immigration area, 45 the Court
does not subject similar federal classifications to this heightened
level of review.14 6
Because Congress enacted Section Five of the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendments, the Court will not characterize the
classifications it creates as "suspect," despite the fact that they
apply only to aliens. Therefore, under the "suspect" class branch
of equal protection analysis, Section Five may be evaluated under
a test lower than strict scrutiny. 47
140. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 198-201; see also The Constitution and the Family,
supra note 122, at 1188.
141. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
142. Id. at 28.
143. The Court has recognized that aliens are a socially and politically handicapped
group within the United States. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
Aliens have come from abroad and faced varying degrees of hostility, suspicion and abuse
prior to their assimilation into American society. See generally Shyameshwar Das, Dis-
crimination in Employment Against Aliens-The Impact of the Constitution and Federal
Civil Rights Law, 35 U. PiTT. L. REv. 499, 533-540 (1974). Their status as aliens has
restricted them from enjoying and exploiting opportunities that would otherwise have been
available to them in the United States. Id. They have been isolated, stigmatized and stereo-
typed. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14
(1981); McLaughlin v. Fla., 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
144. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 372. However, when a state classification based on
alienage relates to a government function or involves the inculcation of American values to
school children, the Court generally employs the minimum scrutiny test. See generally
Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
145. See supra notes 13-47 and accompanying text.
146. See Plyer, 457 U.S. at 223-24 (applying mid-level scrutiny to a legislative clas-
sification of children of illegal aliens); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77-87 (1976) (apply-
ing minimum scrutiny to alien classification created by Congress).
147. See infra notes 203-261 and accompanying text.
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2. Fundamental rights-Under the "fundamental right" branch
of equal protection review, the strict scrutiny test is generally trig-
gered when a statutory classification either penalizes an individ-
ual's access to a fundamental right,148 or imposes a burden on one
who has exercised such a right.1 49 There are arguably two rights
obstructed by Section Five: the right to marry and the right to
familial integrity.
a. Fundamental right to marry-In our society, marriage has
long been regarded as one of the most basic and sacred of social
institutions.1 50 For this reason, the corresponding individual inter-
ests have been recognized as falling within the constitutional right
of privacy.' 5' A long line of Supreme Court decisions makes it
clear that although not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution,
there is a constitutionally protected right to marry which occupies
the status of a fundamental right.'52 As the late Chief Justice
Warren, writing for the majority in Loving v. Virginia'5 3 stated:
"The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men. Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,'
fundamental to our very existence and survival."' Thus, when a
federal government classification significantly burdens or impinges
upon an individual's decision to marry, courts generally subject
such classifications to the strict scrutiny test. 55
b. Fundamental right to familial integrity-Another protected
right Section Five may intrude upon has been characterized as the
right of the immediate family to live together, or family integ-
rity. 56 Although the Constitution is silent on the subject of fami-
lies, freedom of personal choice in matters of family life have long
been within the fundamental right of privacy. 157 The Supreme
148. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969); See also The Constitution and the Family, supra note 122, at
1192.
149. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634.
150. See Strickman, supra note 122, at 949-58; The Constitution and the Family,
supra note 122, at 1159-60.
151. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
152. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383; United States v. Kraus, 409 U.S. 434, 444
(1973); Boddie v. Conn., 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971); Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967);
Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 486, 495 (1965).
153. 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
154. Id. at 12.
155. See infra notes 165-202 and accompanying text.
156. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-05 (1977) (plurality
opinion).
157. Although this right has been asserted under various constitutional provisions, it
has recently come to be rooted in due process protections. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 752-57 (1982). The right of familial integrity is a value basic to our heritage,
and protected by the liberty guarantee of the fifth amendment. See Smith v. Org. of Foster
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Court first extended substantive protection to the right of the ex-
tended family to live together in Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land.1"8 Writing for the plurality, Justice Powell characterized
this right as "fundamental" and went on to state: "[W]hen the
government intrudes on choices concerning family living relation-
ships, this Court must examine carefully the importance of the
governmental interest advanced and the extent to which they are
served by the challenged regulation."159 Accordingly, the Court
has overturned government procedures that do not adequately pro-
tect an individual's right to maintain a familial relationship. 160
In determining whether it will apply strict scrutiny to Section
Five, the Court will look to the directness"61 and substantiality162
of the statute's interference with an implicated fundamental right.
Generally, if the statute directly and substantially intrudes upon
such rights, the Court characterizes the interference as "signifi-
cant" and applies strict scrutiny.16 3 On the other hand, if the in-
terference is either indirect or insubstantial, the Court will use
either the mid-level scrutiny or minimum scrutiny to determine
the constitutionality of the statute.164
3. Interference with the right to marry-The extent to which
the Constitution protects an individual's decision to marry re-
ceived extensive consideration in Zablocki v. Redhail.65 The
Court attempted to reconcile the holding in this case with its ar-
guably inconsistent decision earlier the same term in Califano v.
Jobst.66 In Califano, at issue were sections of the Social Security
Act which provided for the termiiation of a dependent child's
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977); Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v.
Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). The Supreme Court recently indicated that
the alien's right to remain with or to rejoin his or her family is "a right that ranks high
among the interests of the individual." Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982).
158. 431 U.S. 494, 504-05 (1977) (plurality opinion).
159. Id.
160. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 752; Moore, 431 U.S. at 504-05.
161. A direct interference with a fundamental right is similar to a condition prece-
dent in contract law. This type of interference would make a prospective couple's marriage
valid contingent on them meeting a requirement imposed by the government. On the other
hand, an indirect interference is more like a condition subsequent in contract law. This type
of interference "weights the choice by imposing certain consequences upon marriage but
leaves the ultimate choice with the individual." See The Constitution and the Family,
supra note 122, at 1255.
162. In determining whether a statute substantially interferes with the decision to
marry, the Court measures the relative burdens or difficulties imposed by the statute. See
The Constitution and the Family, supra note 122 at 1248-57.
163. See infra notes 165-200 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 160-70 and accompanying text.
165. 434 U.S. 374, 386-90 (1978).
166. 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
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benefits if he or she married an individual who was not entitled to
benefits under the Act. 67 The Court expressly noted that the pro-
vision terminating benefits upon marriage was not "an attempt to
interfere with the individual's freedom to make a decision as im-
portant as marriage."1 6
8
The Social Security provisions did not place a direct obstacle in
the path of those desiring to marry. In addition, there was no evi-
dence that these provisions significantly discouraged, let alone
made "practically impossible," any marriages. In fact, the individ-
uals who challenged these provisions were not deterred from get-
ting married. 16 9 Applying minimum scrutiny, the Court upheld
the provisions.7 0
In Zablocki, on the other hand, the Court applied strict scru-
tiny to a Wisconsin statute which provided that members in the
affected class of state residents could not marry without first ob-
taining a court order. 171 The class created by the statute included
any "resident having minor issue not in his custody and which he
is under an obligation to support by court order.' 7 2 A court
would grant permission to marry only if the applicant could show
compliance with support obligations and that the children were
not likely to become public charges. 73
The Supreme Court explained 7 4 that it was not inconsistent to
apply minimum scrutiny in Califano, and strict scrutiny in
Zablocki because:
[N]ot ... every ... regulation which relates in any way to the
incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to
rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations that
do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the
marital relationship may legitimately be imposed. The statute at
issue here however clearly [did] interfere directly and substan-
tially with the right to marry.
The statute in Zablocki significantly and directly interfered with
this fundamental right because members in the affected class
could not marry without a court order.17 5 In addition, some of
these residents were "absolutely prevented from getting married,"
because they either were unable to meet their support obligations,
167. Id. at 54.
168. Id. at 47-48.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387.
172. Id. at 375.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 386-87.
175. Any marriage entered into in violation of this statute was both void and punish-
able as a criminal offense. Id. at 387.
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or could not prove their children would not become public
charges.' 17
Arguably, Section Five directly and substantially interferes with
the U.S. citizen and alien couple's decision to marry. The legisla-
tive history of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments in-
dicates that the congressional intent behind these provisions was
to intrude upon the decision to marry.17 7 Even though Section
Five is directly aimed at deterring "sham" marriages, it also dis-
courages legitimate marriages. In addition, Section Five's two-
year foreign residency requirement substantially affects the alien's
ability to obtain immediate relative or second preference status
after his or her return from living abroad for two years.'78 in de-
termining whether to grant an alien this status, the INS places
major emphasis on whether the alien and his or her American
spouse cohabited after the marriage.7 9 Of course, some United
States citizens or permanent residents affected by Section Five
will be unable to leave the country and visit or live with their alien
spouse because they lack the financial means. These couples will
inevitably be forced to live apart throughout this two-year period.
As a result, the restrictions of Section Five intrude upon the
couple's decision to marry and make it more likely that the INS
will reject the couple's status petition after the alien has returned
from his or her two year stay abroad.
These arguments will probably fail because Section Five, like
the Social Security provision in Califano, is not a congressional
attempt "to interfere with the individual's freedom to make a de-
cision as important as marriage."180 Rather, the main aim of this
provision is for the government to gain control of its borders by
deterring the incidence of marriage fraud.'8 While Section Five
places substantial burdens on a marriage entered into after the
commencement of deportation hearings, it places no direct obsta-
cle in the path of U.S. citizens (or permanent residents) and aliens
who desire to get married. 2 The affected couple makes the ulti-
mate decision to marry, but the government imposes certain re-
176. Id.
177. By imposing the two-year foreign residency requirement on aliens who marry
during deportation and exclusions hearings, Congress wanted to deter "sham" marriages.
The drafters believed that two years would be too onerous of a burden for parties to a sham
marriage to bear. See H.R. REP. No. 906, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-8 (1986); S. REP. No.
491, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1986). But see Recent Developments, supra note 8, at 325.
178. See supra note 7.
179. See generally E. HARWOOD, supra note 110.
180. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387.
181. See Comment, supra note 5, at 1113-15.
182. The two-year foreign residency requirement is analogous to the condition subse-
quent in Califano.
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quirements after the marriage has been entered into. Moreover,
unlike the statute in Zablocki, Section Five does not make it im-
possible for these couples to marry.18 3
4. Interference with the right to familial integrity-The U.S.
Supreme Court decisions in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,""
and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,85 provide the Court guid-
ance in resolving whether Section Five significantly interferes with
the fundamental right of the family to live together.
In Moore, East Cleveland enacted a housing ordinance that
limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single fam-
ily. However, the ordinance defined a family in such a way that
certain related family members were prohibited from living to-
gether. The result was that petitioner's two grandsons, who were
first cousins, would place petitioner in violation of the ordinance if
they both lived in her home. A plurality of the Court applied
heightened scrutiny and struck down the ordinance because of its
significant impact on the family unit. 88
On the other hand, in Boraas, a village ordinance placed a two
person limit on the number of non-related individuals who could
live in one dwelling. Six unrelated students rented a home in this
area. The Supreme Court first found that this ordinance did not
impinge upon or burden a fundamental right because it did not
infringe on a family's right to live together. 87 Applying minimum
scrutiny, the Court upheld the ordinance.'88
Arguably, Section Five creates a direct and substantial govern-
mental intrusion into the living arrangement of the family.189 By
essentially forcing a U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse to
choose between living abroad with the alien spouse or residing
alone in the United States, Section Five creates a classical Hob-
son's choice. This inevitably leads to disruption of familial
integrity.
The Court, however, will probably find that Section Five does
not intrude to a constitutionally impermissible degree on the right
of family integrity. This provision substantially, but not directly,
impinges upon the family's decision to live together. Unlike the
ordinance in Moore, Section Five does not bring the constitutional
183. Some marriages naturally result in the relocation of one of the spouses. See
Comment, supra note 5, at 1114.
184. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
185. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
186. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-07.
187. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 7.
188. Id. at 7-9.
189. It is also contrary to the immigration family unification policy which histori-
cally has protected the immediate family from separation. See H.R. REP. No. 906, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1986).
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rights of family association into play. 190 The fact that Section Five
requires certain aliens to reside outside of the country for two
years does not amount to a per se disruption of familial integrity.
Marriages often result in the relocation of one of the spouses.191
This conclusion is also buttressed by the legal principle that the
mere prospect that a statute discourages the exercise of a constitu-
tionally protected activity is not sufficient to warrant the applica-
tion of strict scrutiny. Harris v. McRae'92 illustrates the point. At
issue was the Hyde Amendment under which Medicaid recipients
received public funding for medical services incident to childbirth,
but not for certain medically necessary abortions.9 3 The plaintiffs,
who included indigent pregnant women, argued that this legisla-
tion violated the equal protection guarantee of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. 94 The district court agreed. It held
that the Hyde Amendment was constitutionally deficient because
the unequal subsidization of childbirth services and certain medi-
cally necessary abortions impinged on the "fundamental right to
abortion."1 15
The Supreme Court disagreed with the district court. It was of
the view that the funding restrictions "placed no obsta-
cles-absolute or otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an
abortion."' In explaining this result, the Court cited to the sub-
tle, yet crucial, difference between a direct governmental interfer-
ence with a protected right and the government's encouragement
of an activity consonant with legislative policy.' 97 In this respect it
stated:
The Hyde Amendment ... places no governmental obstacle in
the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy,
but rather, by means of unequal subsidization of abortion and
other medical services, encourages alternative activity deemed in
the public interest .... [A]lthough government may not place
obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of
choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation. Indi-
190. See, e.g., Hameetman v. City of Chicago, 776 F.2d 636, 643 (7th Cir. 1985)
("[C]ollateral consequences of regulations not directed at the family, such as regulations
designed to keep illegal aliens out of the country, do not bring the constitutional rights of
the family association into play.") See also, Comment, supra note 5, at 1114 ("Section
Five does not forbid an American citizen to marry an alien, and thus.., this section of the
Amendments does not regulate marriage or family association directly.")
191. See Comment, supra note 5, at 1114. But see, id. at 1114-15.
192. 448 U.S. 297 (1979).
193. Id. at 301-03.
194. Id. at 301.
195. This right was recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150-55 (1973).
196. McRae, 448 U.S. at 314, citing from Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977);
see also L. TRI , supra note 125, at 1346.
197. McRae, 448 U.S. at 315.
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gency falls in the latter category.' 98
The Hyde Amendment did not impinge on the right to abortion
because it left "an indigent woman with at least the same range of
choice in deciding whether to obtain a medically necessary abor-
tion as she would have had if Congress had chosen to subsidize no
health care costs at all."'1 9 Thus the funding restrictions did not
trigger the strict scrutiny test. °°
As discussed earlier, Section Five does have a substantial im-
pact on the right to marry and to familial integrity. However, this
provision, like the Hyde Amendment in McRae, places no direct
obstacle in the path of a U.S. citizen or permanent resident who
wishes to marry an alien. 0 ' Moreover, this section does not place
a permanent obstacle in the living arrangement of the family.20 2
Section Five therefore will probably not be evaluated under a
strict scrutiny analysis.
B. Mid-level Scrutiny
Traditionally, gender classifications have triggered intermediate
scrutiny.20 3 Over the years, however, the Supreme Court has been
more willing to apply mid-level scrutiny to cases that: (1) impli-
cate "sensitive," although not necessarily "suspect," criteria of
classification, 0 4 or (2) involve "important" although not "funda-
mental" interests.05 At least one of these factors dictates that the
Court apply intermediate scrutiny when evaluating the constitu-
tionality of Section Five.
198. Id. at 315-16.
199. Id. at 317.
200. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), the Court was faced with a similar
issue. In this case, a state statute subsidized medical services incident to childbirth, but not
the services incident to abortions. The Court held that under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment this statute did not infringe upon the woman's decision to have
an abortion. Instead it held:
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles-absolute or otherwise-in the
pregnant woman's path to an abortion. An indigent woman who desires an abor-
tion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund
childbirth; she continues as before to be dependant on private sources for the ser-
vice she desires. The State may have made childbirth a more attractive alterna-
tive, thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on
access to abortions that was not already there.
Id. at 474. Like the Hyde Amendment in McRae, the Court held that this regulation did
not impinge on the fundamental right to abortion. Id. at 475-76.
201. See Comment, supra note 5, at 1114.
202. See supra notes 177-191 and accompanying text.
203. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); see also L. TRIBE,
supra note 125, at 1601.
204. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 125, at 1610-18.
205. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
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In Plyer v. Doe,20 6 a Texas statute deprived the children of ille-
gal aliens a public school education. 7 One factor the Court ex-
plicitly considered in applying intermediate review was the "im-
portant," yet not "fundamental" interest in public education.2 08
The other criteria that merited this standard of review was the
"constitutional sensitivity" of the class involved.20 9 Although the
Texas statute did not contain a "suspect" classification, it did im-
pose "a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not ac-
countable for their disabling status."210 Having triggered mid-
level scrutiny, the statute was found to be unconstitutional. 1
Section Five affects the couple's "important" value in marriage
and family association. Although for purposes of strict scrutiny
this provision does not implicate these fundamental rights, it nev-
ertheless burdens the "important" values associated with these
rights. As a practical matter, the provision's interference is indi-
rect, but substantial.212 For example, Section Five prevents aliens
from obtaining an immigration benefit based on a valid marriage
because this provision does not allow couples: (1) to present evi-
dence on the bona fides of the marriage, and (2) to refute or
cross-examine adverse witnesses. Also, the two-year foreign resi-
dency requirement 213 will make it difficult for a U.S. citizen or
permanent resident and an alien to maintain a family if the spouse
and children are living in the United States and are financially
unable to visit or live with the alien abroad.1 4 The couple, as well
as their children, will in most cases be forced to live apart
throughout this period.2 5 In Plyer, the Court recognized that one
reason for applying heightened scrutiny was the fact that the
Texas statute "penalize[d] these children for their presence in the
United States. 21 6 Section Five operates to penalize couples (and
206. 457 U.S. 202 (1982); see also The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L.
REV. I, 62 (1982).
207. Plyer, 457 U.S. at 207.
208. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan stated:
Public education is not a "right" granted to individuals by the Constitution.
Neither is it merely some governmental "benefit" indistinguishable from other
forms of social welfare legislation. Both the importance of education in maintain-
ing our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of
the child, mark the distinction.
Id. at 221 (citations omitted).
209. Id. at 220.
210. Id. at 223.
211. Id. at 230.
212. See supra notes 182 & 202 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 7.
214. Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1978); L. TRIBE, supra note
125, at 1612.
215. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
216. Plyer, 457 U.S. at 220.
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their families) who marry during deportation hearings in a similar
fashion, and thus, this fact militates in favor of the Court's appli-
cation of mid-level scrutiny.
Section Five does not involve a "suspect" classification since, as
the Court noted in Plyer, an alien's "presence in this country in
violation of federal law is not a 'constitutional irrelevancy.' "217
Nevertheless, the fact that Section Five does not involve a "sensi-
tive" class, like the children of illegal aliens in Plyer, should not
prevent the Court from applying the intermediate level of review.
Prior Supreme Court decisions suggest that in certain situations
an "important" right alone will trigger intermediate scrutiny.218
Section Five's onerous burden on the fundamental values associ-
ated with marriage and family justifies the imposition of interme-
diate review.
1. Application of mid-level scrutiny-Under an intermediate
level of review, the federal government may urge that the follow-
ing "important" interests are furthered by Section Five: (1) reliev-
ing the INS of the burden of establishing that these marriages are
not valid in deportation hearings, and (2) deterring immigration
related marriage fraud.
The first interest furthered by Section Five is the administrative
convenience afforded by the irrebuttable marriage fraud presump-
tion embodied in Section Five.219 This provision will indeed
lighten the government's burden in two ways. First, the INS will
be relieved of its burden in deportation hearings of establishing
that the alien should not receive an immigration benefit based on
a marriage to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident. 220 Second, be-
cause Section Five deprives an alien of the opportunity to estab-
lish the bona fides of his or her marriage (if entered into after the
deportation hearing has commenced)2 21 the time and expense of a
217. According to Justice Brennan, who authored the majority opinion, the plaintiffs'
status as illegal aliens was not irrelevant to the question of determining what level of scru-
tiny to apply. Id. at 223.
218. See, e.g., United States Dept. of Agric. v. Murray, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (food-
stamps could not be denied to dependents living with ineligible recipients). Other interme-
diate review cases, however, have implicitly required the presence of both an important
value and a sensitive factor. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S.
432 (1985) (class of mentally retarded persons and important value in housing); Plyer v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (children of illegal aliens and important interest in education).
See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 125, at 1613 n.22.
219. See Comment, supra note 5, at 1106-08.
220. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S 276 (1966) (in deportation hearing the INS has
the burden of proving alienage and deportability by clear, convincing and unequivocal
evidence).
221. See INA § 245(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(e) (Supp. IV 1986); see also supra notes 7
& 8 and accompanying text.
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more extensive hearing is saved. While the efficacious administra-
tion of governmental programs is a valid consideration, it is not a
sufficiently "important" interest to pass muster under mid-level
scrutiny.222
Arguably Section Five furthers the government's second inter-
est-deterring "sham" marriages. The chief purpose of the Immi-
gration Marriage Fraud Amendments was "to deter immigration-
related marriage fraud and other immigration fraud."22 3 Section
Five's objective in preventing fraudulent marriages is undoubtedly
an "important" interest.224
If the government's interest was shown to be important, Section
Five would not pass muster under mid-level scrutiny because it is
not "substantially related" 2 5 to meeting the government's interest
in deterring immigration marriage fraud. Under intermediate
scrutiny, the Supreme Court requires that legislation be "substan-
tially related" to the achievement of the objectives invoked by the
government to justify those rules.226 For example, in Craig v. Bo-
ren,227 the Court evaluated the constitutionality of a statute con-
taining a gender classification allowing the sale of 3.2% beer to
females, but not males, eighteen years of age.22 It held that the
statute's purpose in protecting "the public health and safety" was
an important governmental interest. 229 However, the Court struck
down the statute because the statistics offered in support of this
legislation "broadly establish that .18 % of females and 2% of
males in [the eighteen to twenty year-old] age group were ar-
rested" for drunk driving, and thus provided "an unduly tenuous
fit" to the accomplishment of the government interest.230
The INS estimates of the extent of sham marriages in the
United States present problems similar to the statistics in Craig.
During the Senate hearing, the INS Commissioner testified that
222. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (classification preferring males
to otherwise equally qualified females as administrators of estates not supported by impor-
tant governmental interest-reducing the workload on probate courts).
223. See generally H.R. REP. No. 906, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); S. REP. No.
491, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
224. Id. However, it does not appear that the magnitude of the sham marriage prob-
lem is of such dimension as to render the governmental interest in deterring such marriages
"important." See infra notes 231-38 and accompanying text.
225. See Williams v. Vt., 472 U.S. 14 (1985) (finding unconstitutional an automo-
bile use tax statute because the classification created by the statute was not sufficiently
related to the government's purpose in allowing users of out-of-state roads to pay only one
state's use tax).
226. See L. TRIBE, supra note 125, at 1603.
227. 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
228. Id. at 192-93,
229. Id. at 199-200.
230. Id. at 201-202.
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"INS estimates" indicate that of the aliens who obtain an immi-
gration benefit based on a marriage to a U.S. citizen or permanent
resident, nearly thirty percent231 are involved in "suspect marital
relationships."23 2 However, it is doubtful that "suspect marital re-
lationships" is the equivalent of a "sham" marriage.233 Moreover,
in quantifying this percentage, the various INS representatives
who testified at the Senate hearing gave different and confficting
figures. 4 Accordingly, nothing in the legislative history of this
provision indicates that most marriages entered into after deporta-
tion hearings have commenced are "shams. 235
In contrast, other information and sources cast considerable
doubt on these high figures and on the INS's claim that marriage
fraud is on the rise.236 For example, one commentator estimates
that approximately one or two percent of the immigration peti-
tions based on a marriage to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident
involves fraud.237 Additionally, other statistics show that a very
large number of these immigration petitions are approved each
231. This figure is based on one preliminary survey. See Fraudulent Marriage Hear-
ing, supra note 1, at 35.
232. S. REP. No. 491, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 6 (1986); see also Fraudulent Mar-
riage Hearing, supra note 1, at 69. (An internal study by the INS indicates that 30% to
40% of all applications submitted in support of immediate relative petitions are
fraudulent.)
233. See E. HARWOOD, supra note 110, at 144-56.
234. At one time during these hearings, the INS estimated that the number of
fraudulent immediate relative petitions filed in any given year is between 150,000 and
200,000; and the INS claims that the number is growing. See Fraudulent Marriage Hear-
ing, supra note 1, at 70. But see Note, The Constitutionality of the INS Sham Marriage
Investigation Policy, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1238, 1241 (1986). ("The INS estimates that
50,000 spurious marriage petitions are filed each year and claims that the number is grow-
ing.") At other times, however, it claimed this figure to be 45,000. See Fraudulent Mar-
riage Hearing, supra note 1, at 35.
As to the number of fraudulent visa petitions received by American Consulate offices
abroad, the figures varied according to the geographical location. For example, one em-
bassy in the Caribbean reported that 65% of the visa petitions based on a marriage to a
U.S. citizen or permanent resident and which have been investigated resulted in findings of
fraudulent relationships. See Fraudulent Marriage Hearing, supra note 1, at 29-30. More-
over, although other testimony suggested that fraudulent marriages are also on the rise in
American consulate offices in Europe, Canada, and Asia, no statistics, other than the one
above, were offered on the extent of the problem in these countries.
235. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judg-
ment at 44, Smith v. INS, No. 87-1988-C.
236. See Fraudulent Marriage Hearing, supra note 1, at 78. (Statement of Jules
Coven); E. HARWOOD, supra note 110, at 143.
237. Fraudulent Marriage Hearing, supra note 1, at 78. Mr. Coven, President of the
American Immigration Lawyers Association, argues that statistics show that 95 to 97% of
all visa petitions based on a marriage to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident are approved
each year. Id. at 88. Thus, it follows that a small percentage of visa petitions are not
approved because of fraud or other technical reasons. Another commentator also notes that
despite the high estimate of immigration-related marriage fraud, the INS detects only ap-
proximately 5,000 of such cases each year. See J. CREWDSON, THE TARNISHED DOOR: THE
NEw IMMIGRANTS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA 38 (1983).
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year. This information suggests that most of these petitions in-
volve legitimate marital relationships." 8
Like the statistics in Craig, the INS estimates that "broadly
establish" 239 that aliens who marry during deportation hearings
engage in fraudulent marriages provides "an unduly tenuous
fit"I24 0 to justify Section Five's prohibition on the presentation of
evidence on the bona fides of the marriage,241 and the two-year
foreign residency requirement. These provisions are not "substan-
tially related" to meeting the governmental interest in enacting
Section Five.242 It would not be difficult or burdensome for the
INS to determine the validity of the marriage entered into during
deportation hearings on an individualized basis, like the hearing
afforded aliens prior to the passage of the Amendments.243 Thus,
application of intermediate scrutiny leads to the inescapable con-
clusion that Section Five, as applied to deportation hearings, is
constitutionally deficient.244
238. See E. HARWOOD, supra note 110, at 143. (In a typical year, approximately
95% of all 1-130 immediate relative visa petitions are approved.)
239. Craig, 429 U.S at 201.
240. Id. at 202.
241. It is hard to believe that the INS estimates accurately represent the magnitude
of the "sham" marriage problem. One of the problems in placing an exact number on these
fraudulent marriages is that the INS only knows of the fraudulent relationships it detects.
See E. HARWOOD, supra note 110, at 143. The difficulties in detecting fraudulent relation-
ships and in gathering hard evidence which would enable the INS to legally deny petitions
based on sham marriages also makes quantifying the problem a speculative task. See
Fraudulent Marriage Hearing, supra note 1, at 29; A Report on the United States Com-
mission on Civil Rights, supra note 4, at 34-35. It has also been suggested that the reason
for the great disparity in the figures provided by the INS and other sources reflects long-
standing institutional biases. See Note, supra note 234, at 1240 n.18. (In general, the INS
may tend to overstate the magnitude of a problem because the funding it receives from
Congress will vary with the extent of the particular problem. Thus, the INS will tend to
present statistics showing that the "sham" marriage problem is of epidemic proportions.
On the other hand, lawyers defending aliens may have an incentive to understate the extent
of the particular problem in the belief that Congress will not enact more stringent legisla-
tion.) However, since a very large number of these immigration petitions are annually ap-
proved, it is doubtful that the incidence of marriage fraud is as high as claimed by the
INS.
242. Cf., Williams v. Vt., 472 U.S. 14 (1985); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762,
770-72 (1977).
243. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, Smith v. INS, (No. 87-1988-C). In fact, allowing the alien to present evidence on
the bona fides of the marriage would aid the INS in deterring sham marriages. Of course,
the alien and his or her spouse will have an incentive to introduce all the pertinent evidence
and testimony to make such a showing. Second, the INS workload is lessened because the
investigators do not have to go out and search for this evidence. Rather, with this evidence
in hand, their job will be to determine the weight to be given to such matters. If after an
investigation it turns out the evidence presented by the alien or his or her spouse is defec-
tive, the Attorney General can terminate the conditional resident status.
244. Of course, there are several judicial and legislative solutions that will alleviate
the unconstitutional nature and attendant hardships of Section Five. See generally Craig,
429 U.S. at 199; L. TRIBE, supra note 125, at 1609.
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C. Minimum Scrutiny Analysis
The Court may decide that under either the "suspect" class or
the "fundamental" rights branch of equal protection analysis, the
constitutionality of Section Five should be evaluated under mini-
mum scrutiny. In applying this test, the Court may find that even
under this relaxed standard of review, Section Five is unconstitu-
tional as applied to aliens who marry U.S. citizens or permanent
residents after deportation hearings have commenced.
In enacting Section Five, Congress created two classifications:
aliens who marry after the initiation of exclusion or deportation
hearings; and aliens who marry before the commencement of
these proceedings.24 5 The latter group of aliens is provided an op-
portunity to establish the bona fides of the marriage, and to adjust
their status.2 6 However, aliens in the former group are deprived
The Court could uphold the constitutionality of this provision by interpreting Section
Five, as most provisions in deportation statutes must be construed, narrowly. See, e.g.,
Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 452-62 (1963). While this provision is unconstitutional
as applied to aliens who marry after the commencement of deportation hearings, it could
withstand constitutional scrutiny as applied to aliens in exclusion hearings. A court could
find authority for this interpretation from other provisions in the INA. For example, in
exclusion hearings, the immigration judge is bound by medical certificates provided by the
public health service. In contrast, in a deportation hearing the immigration judge is not
bound by such a certificate. Instead, he must evaluate all the evidence. Medical certificates
are received into evidence during a deportation hearing, subject to the alien's opportunity
to cross-examine the physicians. In fact, unlike in the exclusion hearing context, the certifi-
cates are not conclusive even if the issue of deportability relates to the alien's inadmissibil-
ity on medical grounds. Leon v. Murff, 250 F.2d 436, 438 (2d Cir. 1957); see generally C.
GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, at ch. 5.10d(5). Similarly, a court could con-
strue Section Five narrowly, and allow aliens who marry after the initiation of deportation
hearings to present evidence on the validity of their marriage, while not allowing aliens
involved in exclusion hearings this opportunity. See, e.g., L. TIBE, supra note 125, at
1609. (One of the Supreme Court's "techniques of intermediate review is to require that
the legal scheme under challenge be altered so as to permit rebuttal in individual cases
even if the scheme is not struck down altogether.")
Congress could also cure the deficiencies established by this provision. The Washington
Post, Mar. 26, 1988, at B1, col. I (Senators Paul Simon and Edward Kennedy, "who ini-
tially supported passage of the marriage fraud law now indicate they will work to repeal
the two-year period of waiting outside the United States.") The application of Section
Five's prohibition of establishing the bona fides of the marriage and the blanket two-year
foreign residency requirement will inevitably result in substantial hardship to U.S. citizens
and permanent residents. Eventually, the accumulation of these hardships will result in
Congress amending Section Five to avoid the rigor of deportation by providing a waiver of
these obstacles in certain cases. See, e.g., INA § 212(e); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e) (1982). See
generally C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, at ch. 6.8h. (After the accumula-
tion of hardships, Congress amended INA § 212 which at one time provided for the blan-
ket application of a similar two-year foreign residency requirement for all exchange visitors
who sought permanent resident status after their period of lawful stay in the United States
ended. This provision now allows for a waiver in four situations.) However, although this
solution is the most effective, it will take several years before Congress pursues this avenue
and eliminates the hardships created by Section Five.
245. See supra notes 7 & 8.
246. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
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of these opportunities. 47 In addition, a visa petition to accord
these aliens immediate relative or second preference status cannot
be approved until they have resided outside of the country for two
years after the marriage.2"" Thus, while aliens in both groups are
in similar positions because they marry U.S. citizens or permanent
residents, Section Five differentiates amongst them solely on the
timing of their marriage.
It is undisputed that the government has a legitimate interest in
deterring immigration-related marriage fraud.249 Thus, the main
issue under a minimum scrutiny test will be whether distinguish-
ing between aliens on the timing of their marriage is "rationally
related" to deterring "sham" marriages.
In Francis v. INS,25 0 the Second Circuit addressed a similar
question. At issue was Section 212 of the INA which provides
relief to some aliens involved in deportation hearings.251 Prior to
1976, the Board of Immigration Appeals interpreted this provision
to allow an alien, convicted of a narcotics offense and who de-
parted from and returned to the United States for an unrelin-
quished domicile of seven years, to remain in this country at the
Attorney General's discretion. On the other hand, the Attorney
General was without discretion to allow an alien, like Mr. Francis,
who was convicted of a narcotics offense, to remain in the United
States despite having an unrelinquished domicile of more than
seven years simply because he had not departed from this country
since the time of his conviction. 52 Thus, the main question in
Francis was whether it was reasonable for the government to dis-
tinguish between two aliens merely because one alien was re-
turning after a temporary sojourn abroad whereas the other alien
had never left the country.253
The court in Francis began with an examination of the underly-
ing policy for the Board's distinctions in the application of Section
212. It was decided that the policy was based on Congress' intent
that certain aliens returning to the United States should not be
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. The Court has traditionally exhibited extreme deference to the asserted govern-
mental interests. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-06 (1976); but see
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S.
612 (1985).
250. 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
251. This provision allows the Attorney General to exercise his discretion to admit
into the country an alien who would otherwise be deportable. See generally Griffith, Exclu-
sion and Deportation: Some Avenues of Relieffor the Alien, 15 SAN DISEo L. REv. 79, 93
(1977).
252. See Francis, 532 F.2d at 270-72; see also Dunn v. INS, 499 F.2d 856 (9th Cir.
1974).
253. Francis, 532 F.2d at 272-73.
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denied the opportunity of uniting with their families despite their
excludability.254 However, if this were the case, there was no ra-
tional basis for the Board to distinguish between an alien who had
remained in this country, and one who was returning to the
United States from a temporary sojourn. These aliens were simi-
larly situated except for the fact of departure. 5 In holding that
these distinctions were not rationally related to the legitimate pur-
pose of Section 212, the Second Circuit stated:
Fundamental Fairness dictates that ... aliens who are in like
circumstances, but for irrelevant and fortuitous factors, be
treated in a like manner. We do not dispute the power of the
Congress to create different standards of admission and deporta-
tion for different groups of aliens. However, once those choices
are made, individuals within a particular group may not be sub-
jected to disparate treatment on criteria wholly unrelated to a
legitimate governmental interest. 56
Like the Board's interpretation of Section 212 in Francis, Sec-
tion Five is arbitrary and not rationally related to the federal gov-
ernment's interests in combatting marriage fraud and in promot-
ing family unity.257 Is it reasonable for Congress to distinguish
between two aliens simply because one alien marries a U.S. citi-
zen (or permanent resident) prior to the initiation of deportation
hearings, and the other alien marries after becoming involved in
such a hearing?258 The lines drawn by Congress in drafting Sec-
tion Five are not "reasonably related" to its purpose in providing
benefits to aliens who enter into valid marriages, and in having
deportation hearings reach accurate and reliable results.25 '9 There
is no evidence that suggests that aliens who marry prior to, or
after the hearings have commenced are more likely to engage in
"sham" marriages.210 Aliens in both groups are in the same posi-
tion but for the fact that one group of aliens fortuitously marries
prior to becoming involved in deportation or exclusion hearings.
This provision is arbitrary because it focuses on the timing and
not the bona fides of the marriages when denying immigration
254. Id.
255. Arguably, the alien who had never left the country had a better case for dispen-
sation. See Griffith, supra note 251, at 93-94.
256. Francis, 532 F.2d at 273.
257. See also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1982) (invalidating as irra-
tional a statute which distributed income from the state's natural resources to state resi-
dents based upon the year in which their residency was established).
258. Arguably, the motives of aliens who marry after the commencement of these
hearings are suspect. See Comment, supra note 5, at 1110.
259. See S. REP. No. 491, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1986).
260. To alleviate the harsh results of Section Five, aliens might marry as soon as
conceivably possible to develop an adequate record on the bona fides of the marriage. See
Recent Developments, supra note 8, at 325.
1988]
41
Santana: The Proverbia Catch-22: The Unconstitutionality of Section Five o
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
42 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
benefits to these aliens s.2 ' Thus, like in Francis, there appears to
be no rational basis for denying aliens the twin-opportunities of
presenting evidence on the bona fides of their marriage or of ad-
justing their status merely because of the timing of their
marriage.
CONCLUSION
Although Congress had good intentions in enacting legislation
to deter fraudulent marriages, it showed poor judgment and pen-
manship in drafting Section Five of the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendments of 1986. This provision will likely pass consti-
tutional muster as applied to aliens in exclusion hearings. 2 How-
ever, as applied to aliens in deportation hearings, it suffers from
procedural and substantive deficiencies.
Section Five violates the fifth amendment procedural due pro-
cess rights of aliens who marry U.S. citizens or permanent resi-
dents during deportation hearings. These aliens have a "liberty"
interest, and an undeniable stake in the marriage and the perma-
nent resident status that follows from this relationship. Congress
has also provided the couple with a "property" interest in petition-
ing the INS to have the alien spouse declared an immediate rela-
tive, and ultimately to secure an immigration benefit based on the
marital relationship. Due to these constitutionally protected inter-
ests, aliens who are involved in deportation hearings must be pro-
vided a fair hearing where they will have a reasonable opportunity
to present evidence to establish the bona fides of the marriage.
Section Five is unconstitutional because it provides that sham
marriages are those entered into between aliens and U.S. citizens
or permanent residents after deportation proceedings have com-
menced. Also, it does not allow aliens to present and the immigra-
tion judge to consider, evidence on the bona fides of the marriage.
The mere suspicious timing of a marriage does not support a find-
ing of a sham marriage, especially when other evidence, such as
living together or intentions of living together as husband and
wife, indicates that the marriage was entered into in good faith.263
Accordingly, in order to comply with the due process clause, Sec-
tion Five must provide these married aliens with a pre-deprivation
261. See Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985).
262. See supra notes 90 and 94 and accompanying text.
263. Cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (84-5) (Emo v. United States), 777 F.2d 508,
509 (9th Cir. 1985) (for purposes of determining the validity of the marriage of a witness
who asserts the marital privilege "mere suspicious timing of a marriage does not support a
finding of a sham marriage, especially when other evidence, such as living together or in-
tentions of living together as husband and wife, indicates that the marriage was entered
into in good faith").
[Vol. 25
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informal hearing to determine the bona fides of the marriage.
Section Five falls short of providing aliens who marry U.S. citi-
zens or permanent residents during deportation proceedings the
equal protection of the laws under the fifth amendment. The two-
year foreign residency requirement and the abolition of the adjust-
ment of status defense for these aliens impedes the exercise of the
fundamental rights of marriage and family integrity. Even though
courts will not subject Section Five to strict scrutiny, they should
test the validity of this provision under intermediate scrutiny.
Even if Section Five was enacted to further the important interest
of deterring immigration marriage fraud, it is unconstitutional be-
cause the procedures established by this provision are not "sub-
stantially related" to achieving this interest. Courts may decide
that minimum scrutiny should be the appropriate constitutional
yardstick. Under this test, Section Five does not pass muster be-
cause the lines it draws-aliens who marry before deportation
hearings commence, as opposed to aliens who marry after depor-
tation hearings begin-are not "rationally related" to the congres-
sional purposes in enacting this provision.
1988]
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